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INTRODUCTION 
 Even as early as the pre-Socratics, that is, those forebears of thought and philosophy, 
questions regarding nature and natural law filled the conversations of these people. Questions of 
justice, rights, and law occupied philosophical and dramatic works. Antigone, for example, culminates 
in the conflict between a man-made edict and the “unwritten and immovable laws of the gods.”1 As 
Plato arrived and drew from the inspiration and writing of the Stoics, among others, he formulated a 
full and rich system of natural law. “Plato’s claim to be the first philosopher to set up an objective 
standard of right and wrong independently of the individual conscience is a serious one.”2 From this 
ancient beginning, formulations and opinions with respect to natural law have surfaced, risen to 
prominence, and given way to new understandings and appropriations. Contemporary discussions of 
natural law are, in a way, no different than the millennia-long debates regarding morality and nature. 
Within a Christian context, however, the Catholic theologian has the benefit, if not the authentic 
hermeneutic, to view these question through the lens of faith. It does not require a kind of fideism, 
that is, a necessity of Christian faith; rather, the Christian reality and the truth of faith informs 
reason so that, even amid confusion, the light of the truth might shine forth and through. 
In this context, all natural law theories and ideas are not created equal. This project aims, 
therefore, to trace the development and the promulgation of the arguments for natural law as 
represented by two distinct theories: traditional Thomism and the New Natural Law. Each theory 
represents an effort to transmit transmit the truth as well as to honor the grace-filled wisdom that 
the Church’s Magisterium offers. The timeframe of the investigation will be bracketed by two 
magisterial documents. The document Optatam Totius (Decree on Priestly Training), proclaimed by 
Pope Paul VI during the Second Vatican Council, provides the starting point with its exhortation 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Sophocles,	  Antigone,	  454.	  2	  Michael	  B.	  Crowe,	  The	  Changing	  Profile	  of	  Natural	  Law,	  (Hague,	  Netherlands:	  Martinus	  Nijhoff,	  1977),	  17.	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that “special care must be given to the perfecting of moral theology.”3 The narrative of two theories 
continues through the magisterial treatise on moral theology written by Pope John Paul II in 1993, 
Veritatis Splendor (The Splendor of the Truth). 
 Moral theology underwent great transformation during the post-Conciliar period as the 
casuistry of the previous centuries faded into history. Various personalities and schools of thought 
arose in a prolonged and dedicated attempt to renew and to perfect moral theology. Among these 
varied efforts, Thomism and New Natural Law appear as two mainstream interpretations of natural 
law and consequently Catholic moral theology. Of particular interest is the way in which the 
adherents to two theories actively engage each other through their books and articles.  Such a 
dialectic draws out the specification of each theory, while also illuminating the struggle among 
faithful Catholics to articulate and to defend the moral truths of the Church with respect to natural 
law. 
 The focus of the thesis will be expository rather than evaluative. In this way, it serves to lay 
out the development and maturation of each theory with respect to the other and with respect to the 
standing of natural law in Catholic moral theology. The particular nuances of individual proponents 
will emerge not so much to situate each individual theologian or philosopher; rather, they will 
contribute to a richer picture of the theories more generally. The primary contributors to the 
Thomist position will be Henry B. Veatch, Ralph McInerny, Russell Hittinger, and Steven A. Long. 
Those of particular interest in examining the development of the New Natural Law are: Germain 
Grisez, Joseph M. Boyle, John Finnis, William E. May, and Robert P. George. The thesis will follow, 
generally, an alternating pattern of exploring the arguments of each theory, as expounded by a 
particular proponent, in each theory’s historical progression. Every nuance of the particular theories 
cannot be covered; rather, those aspects that both elucidate and distinguish the theory will be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Second	  Vatican	  Council,	  Decree	  on	  Priestly	  Training	  (Optatam	  totius),	  no.	  16.	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highlighted. At times there may be direct engagement between the two, but, more commonly, 
responses will serve to refine further and to clarify. 
 Great questions have always surrounded moral theology and natural law specifically. The 
contemporary period represents one more attempt to grapple with these concerns and approaches. 
As part of a thorough study of natural law, Professor Michael Bertram Crowe traces the ideas and 
concepts of natural law as they developed from the earliest pre-Socratic period and finds in St. 
Thomas Aquinas an apt description of the maturation of natural law. In examining the twentieth 
century approach to natural law, he identifies a number of prominent issues and contentious ideas 
that all theories need to address and which figure within the debate that we are about to enter. By 
way of brief introduction, then, it might be helpful to identify, though not exhaustively, some of 
these main ideas. 
 Foremost among the features under investigation is the meaning or ambiguity of nature. 
Beyond mention of the numerous definitions and perspectives on “nature,” Crowe notes how 
among many philosophers and academics the concept of nature has fallen out of favor and support. 
“The concept has lost whatever validity it ever had and has no place in the twentieth century.”4 The 
way in which nature is approached and understood suffers many roadblocks. Methods focusing too 
exclusively on biology, metaphysics, science, and phenomenology all face severe critics. Along with a 
methodology of discovery, the very condition of nature, as either dynamic or static, as either fixed or 
evolutionary, these qualities all jockey for identification. For example, the question of end, with 
respect to a metaphysical understanding of perfection or goal, seemingly has no identification with a 
kind of evolutionary science that views nature, not through an ontological lens, but rather through a 
burgeoning or controllable one—“the ethical question of course, is: in what direction, to what end, 
shall the evolutionary process be directed? And the answer cannot be a natural law answer; for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Ibid.,	  256.	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human nature itself is being re-shaped.”5 While this project will not address all these questions, the 
static versus dynamic question of natural law will underline much of the discussion, though often 
implicitly in the theories. 
 Similarly, the question of law, and its grounding and normative power very much drives 
conversations regarding natural law. Certainly the view of law as prescriptive versus descriptive 
comes into play, especially in reference to nature and its use in the makeup of natural law. The 
relation of law (both analogically and univocally) to civil and other human laws draws legal minds to 
new considerations of natural law, particularly with respect to natural rights. It is no wonder then 
that the New Natural Law theory counts many legal scholars and philosophers among its principle 
proponents.  
 Crowe identifies further areas of discussion in the specification of nature as related to ethics 
and evolution. The role that history and bio-evolution play in terms of human development and 
understanding bring the specificity and concretization of natural law up against a more universalized 
view of natural law as “univocally common to the entire human species.”6 Matters of inclination and 
the Is-Ought controversy shape argumentation. In regards to the first, a common sense approach 
might ask in terms of the reasonableness, and thus normativity, of inclination: “Are they reasonable 
because natural, or natural because reasonable?”7 With respect to the latter, significant discussion 
will surround the concern that the connection of such a dichotomy introduces a philosophical fallacy 
that serves to undermine the reasonableness of natural law. Ultimately, and an issue to which both 
theories assume great concern, the focus upon moral absolutes drives the proponents of both 
theories. While not the only impetus, the Church’s proposition of moral absolutes seeks out worthy 
interpreters and defenders. Each strives to be such a guard. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Ibid.,	  266.	  6	  Ibid.,	  281.	  7	  Ibid.,	  284.	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 The proponents of natural law, especially one inspired or influenced by St. Thomas, walk a 
road not as easily traversed as previous generations. Leo Strauss presciently noted that an effort to 
force a teleological science of man into relation with a nonteleological modern science elicits serious 
challenges.8 In his work on natural rights Strauss attacks a historicism that champions the supremacy 
of nonteleological science. The force and details of his arguments need not be brought forth now. 
Instead, what can be learned from his efforts is the importance not only to ground one’s theory of 
natural law, but to understand the ground upon which that theory encamps. This investigation, 
without proposing too bold an endeavor, aims to shed light both on the theories and the 
foundations. The debates open up vistas into details of each side’s natural law interpretation, but 
also serve to dig up the roots and thus expose the presuppositions upon which each rests. The New 
Natural Law theorists, for example, might view the Thomists as building upon a philosophically 
unsound and fallacious base; while the Thomist might see a Kantian deontology in the practical 
reasonableness of the New Natural Law theory. 
 We shall begin, then, in the first chapter from those years following the Second Vatican 
Council during which time Germain Grisez, in particular, begins to formulate his New Natural Law 
theory. The Thomists, who had always been around, respond as well to the efforts of the Council 
Fathers to address the world with the truth and faith of the Church. The second chapter will 
concern itself with the time period following the publication by Pope Paul VI of the encyclical 
Humanae Vitae. Though this paper is not a discussion of birth control or sexual ethics, this moment 
triggered a necessary and strong response on the part of both Grisez and his followers as well as 
Thomists to address and to defend the claims of this Magisterial teaching. A renewed effort emerged 
as the work of natural law theorists took on a very real and prominent relevance. Chapter Three 
begins with the publication of the groundbreaking work by John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Leo	  Strauss,	  Natural	  Right	  and	  History,	  (Chicago:	  The	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1953),	  8.	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Rights. This publication provided a thorough explication of the New Natural Law position and set 
off a rapid and active debate between himself and his associates and the Thomists. Vast differences 
in interpretation both of natural law and of St. Thomas emerged. The fourth chapter concerns the 
debates between the two groups following the book length critique offered by Russell Hittinger. 
These now more directed and sharp discussions take us to the publication of the Magisterial 
intervention into the science of moral theology, the encyclical Veritatis Splendor. This letter from 
Pope John Paul II did not champion a particular interpretation of natural law over another; it did, 
however, identify necessary approaches and perspectives essential to Catholic and authentic natural 
law discourse. Consequently some approaches, e.g., proportionalist, were rejected as not reflecting 
Catholic wisdom. This papal teaching marks the end of our investigation, not because it ended 
debate (if anything it only continued and increased), but because it provided a framework in which 
all future discussion must work.  
 This paper looks primarily at those debates and their substance between the New Natural 
Law theorists and the Thomists. Such an effort serves to understand further the development and 
maturation of each theory. A secondary feature of this work, to which more and future analysis will 
need to be in order, looks at the way in which Catholic moral philosophers and theologians, working 
within the embrace of the Church’s Tradition, seek to formulate and to understand the moral 
teachings of the Church. As each may conclude similarly, their travels take them on divergent routes. 
This effort provides further data concerning how Catholic theologians justly critique each other and 
yet work in union, and thus complement each other in service to the truth. 
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Chapter 1 
A NEW BEGINNING 
 
RENEWEL IN MORAL THEOLOGY 
As His Holiness Pope Paul VI proclaimed the Decree on Priestly Training (Optatam totius) on 
10 October 1965—which included the call for the renewal of moral theology with these words: 
“Special care must be given to the perfecting of moral theology. Its scientific exposition, nourished 
more on the teaching of the Bible, should shed light on the loftiness of the calling of the faithful in 
Christ and the obligation that is theirs of bearing fruit in charity for the life of the world”9—a 
resurgence of interest and scholarship within the field of moral theology was well underway. An 
“openness to the modern world…produced a strong reaction leading them [Christians and 
theologians] from one extreme to the other.”10 That is not to judge that any particular theologian 
fully espoused extreme positions; rather, the ambitious engagement with the modern world led to 
myriad interpretations and developments. Time, and prudential wisdom, sifts through these efforts 
to champion those generous contributions that advance Catholic knowledge and to discard those 
that distract and deter authentic Catholic life and teaching. Great care, therefore, should and must be 
taken in approaching particular ideas and theories. In respect of these efforts and with an eye toward 
the truth, we approach the interpretations of natural law proposed by both the New Natural Law 
(NNL) theorists and the Thomists 
As this chapter progresses, we shall begin with an overview of natural law as proposed by 
the Thomist Yves Simon. In so doing we shall discover a study of some of the issues at stake in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Second	  Vatican	  Council,	  Decree	  on	  Priestly	  Training	  (Optatam	  totius),	  no.	  16.	  10	  Servais	  Pinckaers,	  The	  Sources	  of	  Christian	  Ethics,	  trans.	  Sr.	  Mary	  Thomas	  Noble,	  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  The	  Catholic	  University	  of	  America	  Press,	  1995),	  304.	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natural law and within this thesis. From that macro perspective, we shall proceed to a Thomist effort 
at natural law interpretation. At the same time historically, though subsequent in this paper, we shall 
turn to the proposal of a new natural law championed by Germain Grisez.11 
NATURAL LAW OUTLINED 
 Various lectures given by the philosopher Yves Simon while at the University of Chicago in 
the late 1950s were compiled and published in a comprehensive work entitled The Tradition of Natural 
Law. In these lectures he did not aim to propose a specific interpretation of natural law; instead, he 
offered both questions and reflections upon natural law concerning the difficult problems and 
complexities of its understanding. In the introduction to the revised edition, Russell Hittinger 
remarks: “yet what clamors for explanation is not the diversity of moral custom throughout the 
world but the universal fact that men everywhere under very different circumstances impose some 
restraints on conduct and defend some customs as more appropriate than others.”12 Hittinger goes 
on to observe that Simon offered a clarion call against the “problem of ideology in contemporary 
efforts to reassert or reclaim the tradition of natural law.”13 Simon proceeds, then, with an effort at 
clear thinking in terms of natural law, and it is fitting that we begin with his observations so as to set 
a stage upon which the natural law debate might orderly proceed. 
 Since any discussion of natural law must begin somewhere, Simon reflects generally upon 
law itself, but begins first with an understanding of universals. Of course, he admits that just such a 
question, i.e. concerning universals, descends as far back into history as debates between Platonists 
who proposed an external archetype and students of Aristotle whose universals resided in the mind 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Within	  this	  chapter	  and	  continuing	  throughout	  the	  remainder	  of	  this	  thesis,	  each	  chapter	  section	  will	  be	  titled	  as	  well	  as	  identified	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  particular	  natural	  law	  theory	  being	  proposed,	  i.e.,	  Thomist	  or	  NNL	  (New	  Natural	  Law).	  12	  Russell	  Hittinger,	  “Introduction,”	  The	  Tradition	  of	  Natural	  Law:	  A	  Philosopher’s	  Reflections,	  1965,	  ed.	  Vukan	  Kuic,	  (New	  York:	  Fordham	  University	  Press,	  1992),	  viii-­‐ix.	  13	  Ibid.,	  xxii.	  
	   9	  
but derived from external singulars.14 Without diverting too far down the road of universals, it is 
enough to recognize the primacy of such a concern with respect to laws and natural law in particular. 
He does assert with certainty, however, that “more or less explicitly, every practical doctrine 
presupposes some theoretical position.”15 His brief exposition of the debates and complexities 
surrounding universals serves not to leave the reader in a greater state of befuddlement; rather, it 
highlights the dynamism of dialectic. “In the introduction to a philosophic subject, dialectic and 
history should never be separated. A dialectic is a dialogue: it is the active statement of multiple 
views on a subject.”16 The dialectic is not comprised of both wise and foolish arguments, but it is 
constitutive of historically grounded expositions of reasoned thought and practice. Whereas the 
theoretical position maintains a primal seat, the practical can and often does control the debate 
inasmuch as it builds off of a theoretical framework or reality and brings to the fore applied and 
practical aspects [it tends to be more interesting]. With regard to natural law specifically, Simon 
acknowledges the tension between the practical and theoretical: “the root and nerve of natural law—
the source that makes theories about it possible—is reached not by a philosophical mode of 
cognition, but by a connatural grasp of the good via inclination.”17 At the heart of this balance, 
according to a review of Simon’s work by Stephen Long, “is his refusal to dichotomize the physical 
and moral order” and instead points to the “community between the natural law of the moral world 
and the natural law of the physical world.”18 
 Discussions of natural law must keep its competency in check. Herein ideology tempts with 
overreaching tendencies. Prudence can quickly be smothered and the resulting assertions often lead 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Yves	  Simon,	  The	  Tradition	  of	  Natural	  Law:	  A	  Philosopher’s	  Reflections,	  1965,	  ed.	  Vukan	  Kuic,	  (New	  York:	  Fordham	  University	  Press,	  1992),	  6-­‐7.	  15	  Ibid.,	  5.	  16	  Ibid.,	  11.	  17	  Hittinger,	  “Introduction,”	  xxi.	  18	  Stephen	  A.	  Long,	  “Yves	  Simon’s	  Approach	  to	  Natural	  Law,”	  A	  Review,	  The	  Thomist	  59,	  1	  (1995,	  January):	  133.	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to disappointment and skepticism. “People are quick to realize what is weak, or dishonest, in 
pretending to decide by the axioms of natural law…questions that really cannot be solved except by 
the obscure methods of prudence, and they gladly extend to all theory of natural law the contempt 
that they rightly feel toward such sophistry.”19 The truth regarding real states of affairs continually 
conflicts with those aspirations, especially good ones, of a society at a particular time (i.e., ideology). 
It is important to return again to his earlier assertion— “more or less explicitly, every practical 
doctrine presupposes some theoretical position”— not to pit theoretical knowledge over and against 
practical, but instead to progress from the specific and historical to that persevering truth. Such a 
move serves to safeguard truth. The truth of natural law maintains a certain mystery about it. 
Ideologues and propagandists propose an easy and simply understanding.20 Rigorous investigation 
and theological purity keep error at bay and present a reasonable intelligibility that while perhaps not 
rapidly understood both “feels” and resonates as true. 
 Crucial, then, to a development of this intelligibility is a firm grasp of both “nature” and 
“law.” To both of these Simon offers keen insights that might guide our further discussion. Nature 
can be viewed as both static or dynamic, and either related to morality or sharply distinct from it. 
Drawing from Aristotle and his explanation of essence, Simon remarks, “nature is a way of being 
which does not possess its state of accomplishment instantly but is designed to reach it through a 
progression.”21 In such a system, teleology, or ends, holds pride of place. This dynamism relates the 
beginning to the end. Additionally, the natural (and by natural in this instance I mean physiological) 
realities and conditions of a creature specify and direct (or more contemporarily “orient”) the 
progression from a defined beginning to a related end. An acorn when planted will, in proper 
conditions, develop into an oak tree. If a second grader planted an acorn in her backyard she would 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Simon,	  The	  Tradition	  of	  Natural	  Law,	  23-­‐24.	  20	  Ibid.,	  40.	  21	  Ibid.,	  43.	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not expect a fire hydrant to blossom forth. Contrasted with this dynamic view, René Descartes 
ushered in a modern understanding in which the plurality, teleology, and relation of beginning and 
end reduced to consciousness and extension—neither of which constitutes a nature as previously 
understood. “The truth is that there are no natures in the universe of Descartes.”22 The origins and 
understanding of such a claim can make sense when thinking about mathematics. As one observes a 
geometric theorem in action there is no “better state of affairs” effected.  “The properties of a 
mathematical essence are not effected by this essence, they are identical with it and all the 
development takes place in our mind.”23 Idealism thus assumes the prominent role over teleological 
natural law. Value does not rest within an object intrinsically; rather, a subjective value system 
imposes worth. 
 Law, on the other hand, engages a tension between the primacy of will and intellect (reason). 
This tension drives much of people’s understanding of law, and by extension natural law. The 
contrast is one of a law deriving its power from its inherent reasonableness or one whose act flows 
from the will of the sovereign.24 The understanding of natures, then, closely parallels this debate 
among various opinions. Simon, for example, in undergirding the power of obligation in natural law 
remarks: “natural law, in the very meaning of that expression, exists ontologically before it exists 
rationally in our minds; it is embodied in things before it is thought out, thought through, 
understood, intellectually grasped.”25 Again, without diverting into too lengthy a discussion on law 
more generally, it is noteworthy that Simon presents a particular perspective, or compilation of 
principles, that together form a fullness of nature, law, and obligation. A reasonable approach might 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Ibid.,	  45.	  23	  Ibid.,	  48.	  24	  “The	  question	  is	  whether	  by	  the	  law	  of	  the	  land,	  we	  primarily	  mean	  a	  work	  of	  public	  reason	  or	  an	  act	  of	  will	  elicited	  by	  the	  sovereign	  (whether	  king	  or	  people	  makes	  little	  difference)”(Ibid.,	  61).	  25	  Ibid.,	  137.	  
	   12	  
just as well see obligation resting in that same sovereign volition that imposes upon an object rather 
than draws from an illusory nature.  
 Lastly, and intimately connected to both nature and law, is a reflection upon God, and the 
role that God plays in guiding nature and thus law. God as such need not be conceived of as the 
Christian God, however true such belief is. The necessity of God—see Ivan Karamazov’s 
contention that if there is no God, all is permitted26—leads some to preemptively dismiss natural law 
as deistically myopic.27 Simon notes that, up through the deism of the eighteenth century, some 
metaphysics remained, albeit not as refined as in pre-modern eras; “the laws of nature are guaranteed 
by the divine stability…thus law, which in the order of discovery, …thirdly and ultimately exists in the 
divine mind, where it takes on the name of divine law.”28 The perseverance of thought in a relation 
to God does not derive from a philosophical piety; instead it authentically grounds the foundation of 
natures in creation. The removal of God with an accompanying acceptance of an empty or formal 
“nature of things” may avoid a leap into an infinite inexistence, but does not satisfy in a way that 
God can and does.29 The realities of design, of final cause, and of obligation point to a wisdom that 
suffers the most intelligent and honest of minds to explain away. Perhaps then, in light of its 
profound reasonableness, St. Thomas Aquinas’ definition of natural law persevered for centuries and 
people in both academic and practical settings thrived and progressed—“accordingly it is clear that 
natural law is nothing other than the sharing in the Eternal Law by intelligent creatures.”30 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Though	  not	  quoted	  verbatim	  by	  Ivan	  Karamazov,	  in	  Fyodor	  Dostoevsky’s	  Brothers	  Karamazov,	  Ivan’s	  perspective	  is	  most	  visible	  in	  the	  famous	  chapter	  “The	  Grand	  Inquisitor.”	  	  27	  Simon,	  The	  Tradition	  of	  Natural	  Law,	  63.	  28	  Ibid.,	  138-­‐139.	  29	  Ibid.,	  141.	  In	  a	  note	  on	  this	  same	  page,	  Simon	  offers	  a	  simple	  reflection	  of	  how	  even	  such	  a	  “settling”	  leaves	  a	  rational	  absurdity:	  “The	  problem	  remains	  unsolved.	  Imagine	  a	  painting	  being	  painted.	  There	  is	  a	  pack	  of	  hair,	  a	  ring	  of	  copper,	  a	  handle,	  and	  we	  call	  that	  a	  brush;	  behind	  the	  brush	  there	  is	  the	  painter.	  Now	  suppose	  the	  handle	  of	  the	  brush	  is	  a	  little	  longer.	  Do	  we	  still	  need	  a	  painter?	  Suppose	  the	  handle	  of	  the	  brush	  is	  infinitely	  long.	  Well,	  we	  have	  driven	  the	  painter	  into	  inexistence,	  and	  we	  realize	  that	  nothing	  is	  being	  painted.”	  	  30	  Thomas	  Aquinas,	  Summa	  Theologiae,	  1a2ae,	  91,	  2,	  resp.	  “Unde	  patet	  quod	  lex	  naturalis	  nihil	  aliud	  est	  quam	  
participation	  legis	  aeternae	  in	  rationali	  creatura.”	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Thomist—THOMISM CONTINUED 
 Professor and philosopher Ralph McInerny published a book, Thomism in the Age of Renewal, 
in 1966 as the Second Vatican Council had recently come to a conclusion. In the same spirit of 
renewal to which the Council Fathers called all theologians and Catholics, McInerny aimed to revive 
Catholic philosophy by means of and in continuity with the efforts of St. Thomas Aquinas. Painting 
a less than enthusiastic picture of the contemporary state of philosophy as taught in Catholic 
institutions, he lamented, “with exceptions notable almost because of their rarity as because of their 
substantive contributions, Catholics have not been doing well philosophically and have been out of 
contact with their contemporaries.”31 His work does not set out to propose a particular reading or 
interpretation of St. Thomas; rather, it seeks to understand why the Church directs us toward the 
Angelic Doctor and to renew a deep Thomism that can and does revitalize Catholic thought. “This 
will not be a Thomism for which everything has been settled in advance; but neither will it be one 
for which nothing has been or can be settled philosophically. This will be a Thomism which is, by 
definition, open to every and all instances of philosophizing, but it will not be a dilettantish 
eclecticism either.”32 
 Philosophy, man thinking about the big (and small) questions, does not occur in a vacuum. 
The philosopher is situated in a particular time and place and must address questions arising from 
that context. Not that one is limited by temporality, but one certainly draws from the convictions, 
thoughts, and even myths of the time.33 Thus it is within this backdrop that an ordering of goods 
emerges. The good of knowledge, which fits within the category of truth, does not lay claim to an 
exclusive and overriding precedence. For example, a person’s health should not suffer from the 
relentless, immoderate, pursuit of knowledge. Morality, the ordering of and pursuit of the good, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  Ralph	  McInerny,	  Thomism	  in	  an	  Age	  of	  Renewal,	  (Garden	  City,	  NY:	  Doubleday	  &	  Company,	  Inc.,	  1966),	  86.	  32	  Ibid.,	  33.	  33	  Ibid.,	  110.	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cannot so easily be detached from the intellectual life. The physical and moral order relate more 
closely than some would care to admit. The truth is never trampled upon, but other goods, perhaps 
judged to be lesser, contribute to and stand independent of superior goods. “This is what we meant 
by saying that philosophizing is a human act and that it involves judgments which are essentially 
moral.”34 One need not be a morally upright person to be a good philosopher, artist, or technician. 
However, the attributes of virtue bring a docility to thought and action that leads, at times, more 
easily to the truth. 
 This brief excursus on morality and philosophy relates to natural law as it highlights not so 
much the complexity but the encompassing quality of the human act. It is the complete person who 
acts, not merely a part of that person. For McInerny, the comprehensiveness points to a teleology 
that is inescapable. Actions are not simply aggregations of experiences, nor knowledge mere bits of 
data. “The reasoning behind this is the teleology of man’s defining capacity which is reason; its 
actualization, its perfection or good, is precisely knowledge of the truth.”35 The previous paragraph 
gave the simple example of health being sacrificed for the sake of immoderate pursuits of truth. 
That most would recognize this, intuitively, as wrong gives rise to a wisdom, or natural law, that 
directs a reasonableness to life. The tempering of a good (or perhaps better put, the moderation of a 
good) does not arise from some human or practical construct, but opens up to an ordering of goods 
and thus an ordering of life. The intuitive or gut feeling that informs a person that only 
immoderation is wrong does not stem from a sense of that action being impractical; rather, it flows 
from an inherent unreasonableness.  
 Perhaps a look at how theology plays a role might elucidate further the reality of order and 
wisdom directing one’s actions. Theology is faith seeking understanding wherein faith is a gift and 
not the consequence of a well-reasoned argument. In this sense, philosophy is without faith. But 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  Ibid.,	  118.	  35	  Ibid.,	  125.	  
	   15	  
faith can and does serve as a source of truths that can and must be examined; not that they will be 
disproved, but that their inherent reasonableness be revealed. The Church is in the business of 
preserving, and safeguarding, the deposit of faith. This safeguard is not for the sake of the truth, 
which is beyond reproach, but for the sake of people, that we might not become lost in a cloud of 
doubt or confusion. Thus the Christian philosopher knows, “with certitude of faith, that no one 
could conclusively show that it is impossible that God exists.”36 Such certitude does not immediately 
conclude philosophical certainty, but, “it prods him to find one…rather than being an invitation to 
obscurantism, faith should be a felt obligation to intellectual inquiry.”37 Truth directs the person to 
its attainment. It orders people to their natural end. The proliferation of ideas and contrasting 
“truths” serves not to undermine this assertion; instead, it further points to the obfuscation of the 
human condition as the result of original sin and recognizes the need for grace, i.e. supernatural 
help, “to do correctly what he is inclined to do.”38 
In turning finally to St. Thomas, we can see, by analogy to the deference owed revelation in 
terms of the pursuit of natural truth, the reasonableness of the Church’s interest in and promotion 
of St. Thomas Aquinas as a guide. McInerny makes the helpful distinction of the call for antecedent 
deference as opposed to consequent deference.39 The teachings and writings of St. Thomas are not 
infallible statements; they do, however, provide a rich source of wisdom against which a reasonable 
aspirant might begin a discussion. The absence of an official philosophical orthodoxy does not 
portend a Church adrift in a sea of ideas. Rather, the elevation of St. Thomas offers a profound 
catholicity as “the fitting guide of an introduction to philosophy which introduces to philosophy 
without qualification, to philosophy in all its scope, in all its appearances and efforts.”40 For a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  Ibid.,	  149.	  37	  Ibid.,	  149.	  38	  Ibid.,	  146.	  39	  Ibid.,	  197.	  40	  Ibid.,	  206.	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reading of St. Thomas demands only an informed reason and not any contrived acquiescence. Thus 
St. Thomas does not act as a kind of gate or litmus test through which all Catholic thinkers must 
pass; rather, he serves as a beacon, or lighthouse, as an aid to navigation and not as the wheel or 
tiller. To set a course far from St. Thomas is not to venture into impossible waters but it is to travel, 
perhaps more dangerously, in less charted waters.  
In taking his own advice, then, McInerny offers, in the same year as his book, an article 
examining the meaning of “naturalis” as used by St. Thomas Aquinas in his theory of natural law.41 In 
so doing he sets out to answer two distinct questions. First, how is natural to be understood in terms 
of natural law and natural law ethics; and second, what is the relation between moral precepts and 
natural law precepts—are they equivocal?  
From the outset he proposes that natural implies both a metaphysics and a teleology. After 
distinguishing from laws of nature, e.g., biological necessities like sleeping or eating, he notes, 
“natural law…is precisely the rational creature’s cognitive awareness of the good proportionate to 
his nature as something to which he must direct his actions.”42 Immediately the connection between 
nature and teleology emerges. That is, nature (or the essence of the rational creature) is in a dynamic 
relation to its end, which is the fulfillment of its proportionate good. McInerny observes too that 
precepts consequently follow. With respect to a nature, the dynamism or tension between potency 
and act, between potential and fulfillment compels action toward that which embraces the 
proportionate good. Thus, a deviation could be said to go against one’s nature; that is, to be 
irrational (and in Catholic speak, a sin) is to misconstrue or to deny a constitutive nature. Leaving 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  Ralph	  McInerny,	  “The	  Meaning	  of	  Naturalis	  in	  Aquinas’	  Theory	  of	  Natural	  Law,”	  in	  La	  filosofia	  della	  natura	  
nel	  Medioevo:	  Atti	  del	  3°	  Congresso	  internazionale	  di	  folosofia	  medioevale,	  Passo	  della	  Mendola	  [(Trento)	  31	  
agosto-­‐5	  settembre	  1964],	  Milano:	  Vita	  e	  Pensiero,	  1966:	  560-­‐5.	  42	  Ibid.,	  560.	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aside a discussion concerning the ability to accurately define or identify a human “nature,”43 these 
precepts which flow from a reasoned awareness of this nature constitute a natural law and 
consequently maintain an immutability and universality.  
 As he considers these precepts, however, McInerny is quick to observe that they do not 
constitute the complete set of moral precepts. As he explains, “one can distinguish moral precepts 
of natural law from moral precepts which are not, and that there are two kinds of natural law 
precepts.”44 Pointing to St. Thomas, he recognizes that indeed there can be uncertainty and unsure 
views within moral discourse, on both the specific and the most general level. He cites St. Thomas’ 
treatise on natural law, specifically Summa Theologiae 1a2ae, 94, 4, in distinguishing between the 
necessity of proper precepts and the contingency of common ones. St Thomas relates that, with 
respect to questions of theory (in speculativis), the truth is the same for all in both principles and 
conclusions. “But in questions of action, however, practical truth and goodwill [practical rightness] 
are not the same for everyone with respect to particular decisions, but only with respect to common 
principles.”45 Instinctively people know this. The common example given is the returning of 
borrowed goods. This precept (deposita sunt reddenda) seems so connected to justice that it must 
certainly be one of natural law. However, there could be any number of conditions or qualification 
that would make the return of this particular good at this particular moment injurious to any number 
of parties. “Be just” points to the end or good that is justice, and does not demand an unreasoned 
reaction. McInerny thus notes that St. Thomas finds such a precept (deposita sunt reddenda) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  Here	  one	  find	  sympathy	  to	  the	  earlier	  assertion	  of	  Yves	  Simon,	  namely,	  “more	  or	  less	  explicitly,	  every	  practical	  doctrine	  presupposes	  some	  theoretical	  position,”	  inasmuch	  as	  McInerny	  remarks,	  “So	  too	  in	  the	  practical	  order,	  the	  ratio	  boni	  (quod	  omnia	  appetunt)	  grounds	  the	  first	  precept.	  ‘Hoc	  est	  ergo	  primum	  principium	  legis,	  quod	  bonum	  est	  faciendum	  et	  prosequendum,	  et	  malum	  vitandum’(Aquinas,	  Summa,	  1a2ae,	  94,	  2,	  resp.)	  [And	  so	  this	  is	  the	  first	  command	  of	  law,	  that	  good	  is	  to	  be	  sought	  and	  done,	  evil	  to	  be	  avoided]…What	  practical	  reason	  naturally	  apprehends	  to	  be	  good—that	  is,	  what	  is	  apprehends	  with	  ease	  and	  without	  discourse	  or	  inquisition”(McInerny,	  “Aquinas	  Theory,”	  561).	  44	  Ibid.,	  560.	  45	  Aquinas,	  Summa,	  1a2ae,	  94,	  4,	  resp.	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“defective.”46 Defective is not to say that such a precept is unhelpful—in fact, its specificity inclines 
it to be among “the ones most instructive for human action because they are more concrete”47—
rather, it points to the important distinction between the two types of precepts. Those precepts of 
natural law are analytically connected to the end to which they are concerned and are therefore 
always and everywhere true; while those not of natural law still provide concrete assistance and while 
not equivocal to natural law precepts might still warrant inclusion in a natural law ethic.48 
 In an appendix entitled “Natural Law” to his translation of the volume of the Summa 
Theologiae concerning St. Thomas’ treatise on natural law, Thomas Gilby, O.P., addresses the same 
two earlier points as Simon—“nature” and “law”—and offers complementary insights. With regard 
to nature, Gilby maintains the distinction and presence of two understandings of nature. The first, 
Hellenic and dynamic, means “all unforced activity, including all intelligent and loving activity, 
especially when it proceeds from habit, or second nature, of virtue, whether this be acquired or is a 
free gift of grace.”49 Gilby, a theologian and not a philosopher like Simon (or McInerny), more easily 
infuses his discourse with God and grace. Hence, he relates the dynamism to the historical condition 
of people and the disposition of divine Providence with respect to friendship with God. The end or 
goal of knowing and loving is God…it is not some arbitrary or subjective created thing. The second, 
distinct from but complementary to the teleological meaning of the first, is the Roman typology of 
status or rank: “the second and static meaning and limited to what follows from the essential 
constitution of the rational animal.”50 The tension and complementarity of the two allows for 
theology to broaden and to deepen its reflection. The static quality of human nature unites all people 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  McInerny,	  “Aquinas	  Theory,”	  563.	  47	  Ibid.,	  564.	  48	  “The	  justification	  of	  this	  terminology	  is	  found	  in	  the	  role	  the	  common	  precepts	  play	  in	  validating	  proper	  precept;	  even	  when	  the	  end	  invoked	  is	  not	  always	  and	  everywhere	  dependent	  on	  the	  means	  expressed,	  without	  at	  least	  the	  claim	  that,	  ut	  in	  pluribus	  such-­‐and-­‐such	  an	  end,	  the	  precept	  would	  lack	  all	  validity”(Ibid.,	  564).	  49	  Thomas	  Gilby,	  O.P.	  “Appendix	  3:	  Natural	  Law,”	  Summa	  Theologiae,	  Blackfriars	  Edition,	  Vol.	  26,	  (New	  York:	  McGraw-­‐Hill	  Book	  Company,	  1966):	  166.	  50	  Ibid.,	  166.	  
	   19	  
with a solidarity that individually and communally might receive the grace of relation to the mystery 
of God. Thus St. Thomas can assert that “grace possesses nature without destroying it.”51 And, at 
the same time, it is human nature that strives toward goodness and upon which grace aids and 
propels; else in the context of the mystery of God’s providence a mere human effort remain “tragic 
in its destiny, and impotent even within its own limits.”52 
 In terms of law, Gilby adds to Simon inasmuch as he reflects upon the freedom associated 
with law, “for to be lawful in the proper sense of the term is to act with responsibility in accepting 
the law and making it your own.”53 Of course, by law in association with natural law, it involves 
reason directing toward right action—unjust laws would not subsist in such a specification. Gilby 
allows for such an exclusion because as a theologian he maintains law’s relation to its origin and end 
in God: “This law is received by man as the image of God, and the sociable nature to which it is 
conformed is directed not merely to the common life of good citizenship and urbanitas but to 
fellowship in the society of God.”54 Thus law, in its primary sense (the natural law precepts of 
McInerny) and secondary sense (those moral precepts not of natural law), orders and directs toward 
particular goods “within the analogical comprehension of the universal good.”55 That which is fixed 
is the end, God. Natural law, then, shapes one’s actions into conformity to that end. Rather than 
comprise a “kind of geometric system or body of laws…natural law may give us a sort of yardstick 
for the answers, but not the precise and final test.”56 	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  Ibid.,	  168.	  52	  Ibid.,	  168.	  53	  Ibid.,	  170.	  54	  Ibid.,	  169.	  55	  Ibid.,	  171.	  56	  Ibid.,	  171.	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NNL—A NEW NATURAL LAW 
 In 1964, in the Natural Law Forum of the University of Notre Dame Law School, Germain 
Grisez published an article in which he articulated the new natural law interpretation that he and 
others would offer to the Catholic world.57 In so doing, he aimed to read into St. Thomas an 
elevation of practical reason as sufficient over and against theoretical truths with respect to human 
nature. The implications for such a foundational premise take this new natural law on a path that, 
while oftentimes arriving at the same end as the Thomists previously mentioned, offers a 
significantly alternate route. It may be best, then, to quickly outline the major points of this 
innovative work. Grisez himself offers five goals to be achieved: first, he aims to recover a proper 
understanding of St. Thomas’ first principle of practical reason (bonum est faciendum et prosequendum, at 
malum vitandum); second, good and evil as presented in this principle must be understood as well with 
respect to final causality; third, the principle serves as a source of action rather than as an opposition 
to positive action; fourth, the principle must be extracted from its limited confinement to an 
imperative; and fifth, the many self-evident principles of natural law emerge with a proper 
interpretation, as opposed to regarding all specific precepts as conclusions from the first principle.58 
 Grisez locates the organizing factor in natural law precepts, i.e. that which brings the 
multitude into an orderly whole, in practical reason’s “legislation, only insofar as it is subject to 
practical reason’s way of determining action.”59 These precepts, then, are not conclusions but are 
self-evident—natural law is constituted by the precepts of practical reason. He thus rejects the 
interpretation, specifically formulated by Jacques Maritain in his work Man and the State (Chicago, 
1951), that “man’s knowledge of natural law is not conceptual and rational, but instead is by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	  Germain	  Grisez,	  “The	  First	  Principle	  of	  Practical	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  A	  Commentary	  on	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  Summa	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  Ibid.,	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  Ibid.,	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inclination, connaturality, or congeniality.”60 In short space, but thoroughly worked out, Grisez 
dismisses theoretical knowledge (and with it a view toward metaphysics) as a basis for coming to 
natural law precepts and places the source in practical reason. He finds support for this claim in his 
reading of St. Thomas. Specifically, he looks to how St. Thomas explains “self-evident.” Self-
evidence most fully expresses itself in those things that come to mind (or fall within the grasp of 
everyone).61 Intelligibility, or the subjective knowing, characterizes self-evidence. Per se self-evidence, 
i.e., a kind of internal intelligibility without respect to any subjective appreciation, which suggests a 
kind of interpretation associated with Maritain and leans upon a strong metaphysical realism, is a 
misinterpretation. Grisez points out, however, that his interpretation does not veer toward a modern 
separation of truths of reason and fact; meanings are grounded in the firmness and truth of reality.62 
It is the intelligence that utters the word that presents intelligibility.  
“Practical reason does not have its truth by conforming to what it knows, for what practical 
reason knows does not have the being and the definiteness it would need to be a standard 
for intelligence. Only after practical reason thinks does the object of its thought begin to be a 
reality. Practical reason has its truth by anticipating the point at which something that is 
possible through human action will come into conformity with reason, and by directing 
effort toward that point.”63 
 
“Directing effort toward that point,” emphasizes the tendency of practical reason to comprise the 
material (i.e., the good) concerning which reason lays hold and to which it directs and carries out 
action. In summation, “the precepts of reason which clothe the objects of inclinations in the 
intelligibility of ends-to-be-pursued-by-work—these precepts are the natural law.”64 
 Grisez strongly emphasizes the translation of bonum est faciendum et prosequendum, at malum 
vitandum with respect to prosequendum. The pursuit is often excluded in the more common 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60	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  at	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  61	  Ibid.,	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  of	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  of	  experience	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  Ibid.,	  176.	  64	  Ibid.,	  181.	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interpretation—Do good and avoid evil.65 The absence of pursuit, it turns out, similarly excludes a 
strong teleology. What remains is merely a “quality of moral action,” i.e., no view toward and 
relation to an end. Having just elevated practical reason, Grisez notes that “practical reason 
prescribes precisely in view of ends.”66 Thus, rather than make a consequent judgment of moral 
value, the emphasis on pursuit acknowledges reason’s role in directing toward a specified end—an 
intelligible good. Reason can grasp these goods and the inclinations toward them as worthy of 
pursuit. Action comes to be seen not as a mere means to an end, but “an object of choice.”67 Thus 
the end comes to give value to the action. The end, grasped by reason, shapes actions. 
 Similarly, Grisez aims to correct an overly static and prohibitive interpretation of law. 
Pointing to St. Thomas, Grisez understands law “as a principle of order which embraces the whole 
range of objects to which man has a natural inclination.”68 In fact, it is law that makes life possible; 
“rational direction insures that action will be fruitful and that life will be as productive and satisfying 
as possible.”69 As a source of action, law does not stand in a kind of deontological position of 
offering an ought in opposition to what one wants or wills to do. Consequent to the positive aspect 
of law, a greater if not often undervalued sense of responsibility emerges. Grisez proposes a 
profoundly active and deliberate person, whose agency draws from the practical reason. 
 Natural law becomes a directedness toward possibility—“is to be.”70 Grisez notes that is it 
“prescriptive” and not imperative.71 That is, by prescriptive, he means that the will, as informed by 
the practical reason, accepts the possibility of the principle of action toward the basic goods, and by 
imperative, he means a judgment like a theoretical judgment in relation to the order in a thing.  In 	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  Ibid.,	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  Ibid.,	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  Ibid.,	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  Ibid.,	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  is	  noteworthy	  and	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  Ibid.,	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explaining this, as not consequent, Grisez further observes, “to know the first principle of practical 
reason is not to reflect upon the way goodness affects action, but to know a good in such a way that 
in virtue of that very knowledge the known good is ordained toward realization.”72 Natural law, 
then, can be seen as a kind of guidepost, albeit a very persuasive and true one. It does not act as the 
support for an imperious will enforcing a theoretical precept. He continues to refine and to explain 
the proper use and relation of practical reason to natural law. He further avoids Hume’s is-ought 
denial by persistently correcting and noting that the principles are not facts but are underivable. 
Practical reason directs toward the good and the end; that is what it does. Thus it does not need nor 
rely upon facts, but rather follows from a naturally formed set of underived principles that then 
shape or guide action. In what amounts to a direct contraposition to the traditional Thomist 
interpretation, Grisez asserts that his position and interpretation avoids the Humean pitfall of is-
ought. At the same time, a difficult challenge awaits a proponent of any supposition that examines 
human nature and an action’s conformity to it.73 
 Lastly, within Grisez’s foundation work, he aims to correct the mistaken interpretation that 
the first principle acts as a kind of major premise from which all precepts derive.74 Though it does 
not form the other precepts— it like them has the “status of self-evident principles of reason”—the 
first principle relates to the other underived principles inasmuch as it gives accord to their 
intelligibility.  It “is like a basic tool which is inseparable from the job in which the tool is used; it is 
the implement for making all the other tools to be used on the job, but none of them is equivalent 
to it, and so the basic tool permeates all the work done on the job.”75 The distinction and relation 
leads to an emphasis on intentional action. Each underived good claims a necessary openness from 
the actor towards its pursuit. No one holds a necessary claim.  	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  Ibid.,	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  Ibid.,	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 Thus armed with a foundation for a new natural law interpretation, Grisez continues to 
implement his understanding. He publishes a book, entitled Contraception and the Natural Law, in 1964 
and later publishes an article in a 1966 issue of the Thomist, in which he expounds upon this new 
theory in the context of the discussions surrounding contraception.76 While acknowledging that in 
fact certain natural, or biological, facts are at play, the ought or morality of an act, and in this case the 
sexual act, is “in our power to such an extent that what will in fact occur is contingent on our 
freedom.”77 Since such actions involve choice, they are not physically determined nor intuitively 
derived. Rather, an a priori knowledge, a reasoned determination that moves toward an end, or good, 
directs actions. Rejected, then, are any systems that find determination in a built-in (or fated) nature 
or in a voluntarist fiat. The good to which reason directs would be one of a number of underivable 
human goods that sum to the total possible good that man can attain.78 Grisez identifies one of these 
goods as “the procreative good.”79 The particular arguments regarding this good and those against 
contraception are less important for the current discussion. Instead, the methodology reveals a 
number of features of this new natural law. Any proportional or utilitarian analysis of this good in 
relation to others becomes like comparing apples to oranges—thus the goods are incommensurate.80 
Further, there is no external sense of morality that shapes a choice; “moral life is a progress open 
toward infinite self-transcendence.”81 Grisez offers a moral standard that builds not upon 
metaphysical or natural facts but upon an ideal—an ideal that manifests itself in a total openness to 
this same self-transcendence.82 This openness demands an avoidance of violating any fundamental 
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human good. Every particular good cannot be engaged and pursued at the same time (such an effort 
would be impossible); however, “what is required for the goodness of the human act is not that it 
have the best consequences, but that it proceed from a truly good will, a heart bent upon all the 
human goods as the images of Goodness Itself.”83 A particular good can and must be a starting 
point for action; while at the same time other goods cannot be trampled upon. An action, for it to 
be fully human, must be fully understood. Reason must grasp the fullness of the act; i.e., the natural 
or biological facts can come into play here. In the example of contraception, “sexual activity cannot 
be understood without understanding its reference to procreation.”84 Since the procreative good is 
inseparable from the sexual act, any action without reference to it violates such a good. In making 
the case against contraception, Grisez uses the basis or foundation of the underived human goods to 
determine morality of actions. 
ST THOMAS FOR ALL 
 At the beginning stages of their disputes, each theory lays the groundwork in different, and 
at times opposing, ways. The Thomists, as championed by Ralph McInerny, seek first to point to St. 
Thomas as both a safe and worthy guide in any natural law endeavor. Simon suggested St. Thomas 
be used as an inspiration, both in terms of dialectic and guidepost. For McInerny, however, St. 
Thomas serves as more than a guide; he is the master and points out clearly the path to be trod. 
Discussions of nature and law relate and flow from his inspiration. For Germain Grisez, on the 
other hand, he too seeks to follow St. Thomas. But he does not find himself as restrained by more 
classical Thomistic interpretation. At these initial phases, he sees in his theory a richer and more 
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authentic interpretation of St. Thomas. Such allegiance will not always be the case, but for now, 
difference in interpretation is credited with mistakes and not innovation. 
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Chapter 2 
POST HUMANAE VITAE 
 
A WIDER MORAL UNIVERSE 
The decade following the promulgation of Humanae Vitae by Pope Paul VI brought great 
conversation, argument, and dissent within the Catholic moral world. Inasmuch as arguments 
centered around Humanae Vitae specifically, the Church’s role with regards to teaching and natural 
law assumed a more prominent place. Theology and Church teaching found themselves, at times, in 
opposing positions. Lucid and rational arguments for or against contraception flowed prolifically—
though more often in a manner opposed to Humanae Vitae. As these arguments touched upon 
natural law, and its use within and by the Church, it would be advantageous to look at, briefly, a 
perspective on the teaching authority of the Church and its relation to natural law. The Jesuit Joseph 
Costanzo offers such a perspective.85 Such an excursus will, I submit, help to distinguish both the 
duty that the Magisterium plays in interpreting natural law and declaring a specific teaching, and the 
obligation or role that a theologian offers in the understanding of the truth. Though certainly 
contentious, Constanzo’s perspective will help to contextualize the responsibilities undertaken by 
both the New Natural Law proponents and the Thomists in their efforts to properly interpret 
natural law. 
As the twentieth century began and progressed, natural law and natural law arguments began 
to appear more frequently in the context of magisterial documents. As the popes in particular began 
to exercise their authority and jurisdiction toward the whole world86 such an endeavor lent itself to 	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  S.J.,	  “Papal	  Magisterium,	  Natural	  Law,	  and	  Humanae	  Vitae,”	  American	  Journal	  of	  
Jurisprudence	  16	  (1971):	  259-­‐289.	  86	  See	  Vatican	  I,	  especially	  Pastor	  aeternus,	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  3:9.	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the use of arguments and reasoning accessible to all. Though the Church employed various natural 
law arguments to support its teaching, it is important to recognize (and this is often a point of 
contention or simply overlooked) that such teachings do not depend upon the arguments of natural 
law to prove their veracity.  “Whenever the Church teaches natural law doctrine or a specific 
application of it to a concrete moral issue, it does so by virtue of the Petrine commission, and not as 
eminent philosophers or world-renown metaphysicians.”87 In stark terms, the Church need not offer 
any philosophical rationale for a teaching beyond its divine assurance; however, such an approach 
would be neither helpful nor effective for spreading the Gospel. In fact, as will be explicated more 
fully decades later by Pope John Paul II in his encyclical Fides et Ratio, the Church need not fear 
reason—truth is unitary since God is one88. Thus a purification of reason, i.e., reasoning well, can 
and does serve to further the understanding and deepening of faith—a faith preserved by the 
Church. The Church, as authentic interpreter of faith, is  
“competent in her magisterium to interpret the natural moral law. It is in fact indisputable, as 
Our predecessors have many times declared, (l) that Jesus Christ, when He communicated 
His divine power to Peter and the other Apostles and sent them to teach all nations His 
commandments, (2) constituted them as the authentic guardians and interpreters of the 
whole moral law, not only, that is, of the law of the Gospel but also of the natural law. For 
the natural law, too, declares the will of God, and its faithful observance is necessary for 
men's eternal salvation.”89 
 
In touching upon both natural and supernatural truths, the Church teaches in a manner that ensures 
God’s saving truths are transmitted with certitude and without error. Her arguments offered on 
behalf of revealed truths thus employ natural law so as to demonstrate the reasonableness of the 
truth, not to prove it. 
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  legislates	  the	  lex	  naturae	  and	  the	  lex	  Christi”	  (Ibid.,	  274).	  89	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  Pope,	  Humanae	  Vitae,	  Vatican	  Translation,	  (Boston:	  Pauline	  Books	  and	  Media,	  1968),	  no.	  4.	  
	   29	  
 Costanzo briefly traces the manner in which Church teaching is promulgated. Reaching back 
as far as the apostolic period, he notes that the pedagogy of Scripture and the Church more generally 
is proclamation and teaching, rather than discursive. “The four Gospels and the Epistles are 
declarative, authoritarian, affirmatory, and prohibitory in their pedagogy.”90 Even Vatican II, with its 
profoundly pastoral approach, is tempered with respect to discursiveness: “its discursiveness is 
addressed to those who already hold to certain beliefs and convictions.”91  
Again, all this is not to dogmatize teaching or to insist upon a kind of ecclesial positivism; 
rather, it stresses strongly the underlying certainty and truth supporting Church teaching. Nor does 
the work of theologians, those entrusted with the responsibility to venture into the depths of 
revelation, become mere bookkeeping or proofing. Natural law, and natural truths, discover their 
profound dignity in the “revelation of the supernatural dignity of man and above all and much more 
so by the Incarnation.”92 The one and same salvific morality relates natural law to evangelical 
morality. In many ways, the promotion and the explication of this relation falls to moral theologians. 
The truth about human nature, i.e., how God made and knows the world to be, does not progress in 
a Hegelian pattern of progress; rather, development functions as a means by which God speaks and 
continues to speak to every generation the one and same saving Truth.  
 The theologian, and in this case the Thomist or New Natural Law theologian, serves the 
truth by bringing reason to bear upon revelation and preserving the communion of faith. The 
Church is charged by God with the protection of the sacra doctrina. In so doing, She is endowed with 
divine help, i.e., divine assurance. Particularly as we move into a post-Humanae Vitae period, it is 
essential to recall continually this simple but necessary reality. The Church need not explain Herself; 
though She does. The present investigation keeps this always in mind. As arguments arise—and 	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  267.	  91	  Ibid.,	  268.	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  272.	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varied will they be—to support the Church’s teaching, they must continually ponder how they 
reflect this divine wisdom of the Church. The Church proposes no official school or way of 
proceeding philosophically.93 The truth is not created by people. The theologian must always avoid 
opening the faith to ridicule. In so doing, he or she serves both truth and the Church. 
 It is against this kind of backdrop, i.e., service to the Church and to the Truth, that the 
Thomists and the NNL theorists begin to develop their own interpretations of natural law and to 
critique the other’s natural law system. It is to this mission of thinking cum ecclesia that each group 
faithfully dedicates itself. This chapter will therefore focus upon the period following the release of 
Humanae Vitae through 1980. The exposition will alternate from Thomist to NNL, back to Thomist 
and conclude with two sections on the NNL. Little direct debate occurs between the two groups as 
more efforts seem to be oriented toward the defense of Church teaching, and Truth. The divergent 
viewpoints begin to develop more clearly, however, in this period. 
Thomist—AN ONTOLOGY OF MORALS 
 In the first years of the 1970s, philosopher Henry Veatch authored a book, For an Ontology of 
Morals: A Critique of Contemporary Ethical Theory, in which he proposes to seek a restoration of 
ontology, i.e., metaphysics, to ethical conversation. He offers a simple proposition; namely, moral 
and ethical distinctions are grounded in the very nature and being of things, and not elsewhere.94 In a 
short and breezy paragraph, and by way of introduction, Veatch rapidly concludes that a reasoned 
characteristic of judgment implies some kind of basis in fact and nature and therefore “there would 
appear to be no escaping the conclusion that not just a natural-law ethics but any ethics must carry 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  93	  “The	  Church	  has	  no	  philosophy	  of	  her	  own	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  underlying	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  to	  its	  own	  principles	  and	  methods.	  Otherwise	  there	  would	  be	  no	  guarantee	  that	  it	  would	  remain	  oriented	  to	  truth	  and	  that	  it	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  by	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  governed	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  et	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  Translation,	  (Boston:	  Pauline	  Books	  and	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  1998),	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  49].	  94	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  Veatch,	  For	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  of	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  Ethical	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  University	  Press,	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with it either implicitly or explicitly a commitment to no less than an ontology of morals.”95 He 
attempts to show in his work that any system of ethics not based on an ontology of morals, that is, 
based on something else, e.g., linguistic or some other subjective determinant, loses any grounding 
whatsoever and leads ultimately to a kind of nihilism.96 The specific critiques of various modern 
schools of ethics is indeed probing; however, they lie beyond the scope of this project. One remark 
may be worth noting. As a kind of proof by counter-example, Veatch attempts to redeem some 
modern conceptions by proposing a “transcendental turn” by which various linguistic and 
subjectively oriented ethics may rely upon their own characteristics to avoid a march toward 
nihilism. Such a turn “is supposed to mean that ethical principles, though neither evident in 
themselves nor susceptible of any direct rational justification, may nevertheless be justified”97 
according to an algorithm based upon that particular ethic’s necessity—e.g., principles “which we 
find to be inextricably woven into the warp and woof of those basic language forms in terms of 
which we discourse about things and about the world.”98 Despite his strong efforts, Veatch identifies 
a number of obstacles and challenges that make such a transcendental turn difficult, if not 
impossible. The only viable option, he proposes, is a return to an ontology of morals. 
 As Veatch outlines his restoration of an ontology of morals, he does so with a return to 
Aristotelian concepts. The understanding of goodness, for example, does not derive from a 
subjective interpretation; rather, goodness is that which is actual or perfect as compared to potential 
or imperfect with respect to the fulfillment or completion of a thing.99 It becomes immediately 
apparent, therefore, that such an understanding of goodness requires, nay depends upon, existent 
natures. His emphasis on goodness does not stop with a static quality. Relation, and appetite as St. 
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Thomas calls it, toward the end or fulfillment makes out the good.100 The good, it must be noted, is 
not good because it is desired; it is desired because it is good, whether it is known or not. All 
judgments and facts, everything having to do with choice, are action-guiding. Try as one might, man 
cannot escape the reality of his natural ordering, and ordering toward virtue. “Suppose that it is 
incumbent upon a man to make something of himself…—such things represent obligations and 
standards of conduct which simply as a matter of fact do pertain to human beings and are binding 
upon us…to which we are oriented in virtue of our very capacities and potentialities as men.”101 The 
task for the moral theologian, then, or even for the person more generally, is to seek out the truth 
with respect to human nature and direct one’s life in light of those guiding truths and principles. 
 In concluding his work, Veatch offers responses to the challenges facing his system, 
beginning with a Humean subjectivity.102 With respect to the blindness of Hume, in that Hume sees 
no relation between virtue and vice and matters of fact, Veatch credits this blindness to a failure to 
recognize that objective facts can “be viewed in abstraction for the values and disvalues that pertain 
to them”103 without constraining them to exist only as such. That is, because a person in his or her 
intellect can and does abstract from reality this does not in reality irrevocably sever such a fact or 
quality from its relation to the object and to prior potentialities. In investigation, even scientifically, 
with these potentialities and actualities, one finds oneself facing a question of nature, quiddity. “What 
then is the standard in the case of man? It is simply that of being a rational animal. This, indeed, is 
the very heart and core of natural-law ethic.”104 
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 Following a critique of utilitarianism, Veatch includes a brief but thorough criticism of 
Kantian deontology. Kant, it seems, will not consider any inclinations or feelings, be they directed 
toward the good or otherwise, as even remotely grounding his ethics. So too nature, as constitutive 
of rational creatures, is off limits. In its place he proposes a practical reason which Veatch remarks 
brings forth “the floodgates [that] are opened to those murky Kantian waters, filled with strange 
doctrines of the intelligible world as over against the phenomenal world, and how and why it is that 
only practical reason and not theoretical reason is competent to provide any kind of knowledge of 
the former.”105 But Veatch offers grave concern with respect to the reality that Kant’s system 
depends upon formal characteristics that cannot be fully known.106 Thus, in practice, a negative 
approach must be taken in which any attempt toward proposed moral laws can be judged false, but 
not true. Further investigation and explication of Kant can and certainly should be done; it is 
sufficient to conclude, however, that, for Veatch, Kant, like the utilitarians, necessarily turns away 
from an ontology of morals, when in fact such a grounding provides the only real option for morals. 
NNL—WHAT ARE HUMAN GOODS? 
 Contemporaneous but in contrast to the approach taken by Veatch, Germain Grisez and the 
New Natural Law proponents make great efforts to identify the basic human goods that underline, 
or motivate, human morality. Such an investigation stems from a desire to discover the reason for 
which distinct and deliberate choices are made. They are not consequential reasons but can be seen 
as incommensurate ends. For example, he identifies “aesthetic experience” as a basic human good. 
Thus an actor seeks after an action with respect to aesthetic experience because of the value of that 
experience (before even its actualization) for its own sake.107 The goods are ends to which Grisez et 
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al. hold up their teleological framework of morals. Ultimately, he arrives at eight such goods108 that 
serve as the totality in terms of categories of the fundamental reasons for human action.109 These 
goods, in their irreducibility, also direct us toward a full understanding of the human person because 
their achievement or actualization embodies human fulfillment. Each in its own particular way 
contributes to the fullness that is the human person. Consequently, each is incommensurate since no 
part of human nature can be considered less than any other. The dignity of each good demands a 
fuller knowledge and deliberate choice in every action; that is, a particular good cannot be sought in 
a manner or for its own sake so as to denigrate or violate another essential, or basic, human good.  
 Looking more closely at the goods and their identification, we discover deep teleological 
underpinnings to these good—Grisez sees them as purposes. They do not stem from the kind of 
intuition that the Thomists like McInerny employ to understand human nature. Instead, they are 
“goods” which people pursue for their own sake. Such a pursuit avoids becoming bogged down in 
subjectivity, i.e., a compilation of billions of perspectives, by insisting upon each good being 
irreducible. Grisez illustrates this with the example of patriotism. Certainly countless societies have 
championed some kind of patriotism specific to their time and place. It would be tempting, 
therefore, to see this common, though not quite universal, good and declare, “Voilà, a basic good!” 
Very quickly, however, because of the varied practices and by further reflection, it is realized that 
patriotism “is no more than a limited aspect of the broader category we have called ‘friendship.’”110 
The near-universal application of patriotism helps us to understand how morality begins to take 
shape in such a system. Friendship as a category, and patriotism as widely but not quite universally 
applied, directs human action. Though “directs” is not quite the right word—perhaps better: the end 
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on account of which action proceeds. One can find a kind of consensus, then, that friendship is 
rightly considered a basic human good. 
 When judging morality with respect to basic human goods, the emphasis on why becomes 
important. “In order to be possible, human actions must be for purposes.”111 Grisez highlights the 
two pillars of human morality as freedom and purpose. An agent’s moral calculus and the 
information that one uses to make a judgment come solely from internal rather than external 
sources.  
“Fundamental human purposes are not outside us but within us. They are aspects of man, 
intrinsic human possibilities  whose realization is up to us. When a person acts to realize one 
of these purposes, he is not going to achieve something outside himself. Rather he is striving 
to bring into being some part of himself by participating (taking part) in the good toward 
which he acts.”112 
 
Every action thus becomes a choice for openness to self-realization. Not that such “realization” is in 
itself a good; the full range of human self-actualization comprises the flourishing of each basic good. 
At the same time any human choice and action necessarily limits that person, i.e., it closes off certain 
possibilities. There is a distinction, however, between choosing one option as subsequent to 
rejecting other goods and choosing a good while respecting the worth of the others. More than in 
theory, this can be seen in the use of certain means that either respect or disregard the other basic 
human goods. Immorality is seen as engaging in irrationality. This occurs when it involves an 
exclusive closing off; it fails to acknowledge the truth of man’s condition and flourishing though 
participation in human goods.113 
 Essential to the flourishing of human life with respect to the basic human goods is a 
freedom on the part of the person to choose the particular good. Against a common stream of 
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philosophic thought that would deny such a freedom to human agents, Joseph Boyle, Germain 
Grisez and Olaf Tollefsen offer a concise argument asserting that someone can make a free 
choice.114 A “norm which prescribes unconditionally between open alternatives has, as a necessary 
condition for its being in force, the ability to make a free choice on the part of the person directed 
by such a norm.”115 The authors demonstrate this by showing that the opposite proposition, i.e., no 
one can make a free choice, is self-defeating. Among the ways in which they prove this is by 
recognizing that any rational affirmation of the negation of free choice must necessarily appeal to a 
norm guaranteed by free choice’s reality. “Thus the truth of Nfc [no one can make a free choice] 
entails the impossibility of rationally affirming Nfc.”116 Thus the many self-refuting arguments set 
against free choice’s negation coupled with the data of experiences of choice lead toward an 
assertion that in fact people have the capacity to make free choices—and they do make such 
choices.117 
Thomist—A THOMISTIC TURN 
 While the New Natural Law proponents are formulating defenses and explanations for their 
approach, the philosopher Ralph McInerny continues in the same vein as Henry Veatch in looking 
toward and defending both naturalism and a Thomistic ethic.118 In so doing he seeks to determine 
the meaning of goodness, that is, whether it resides in the thing itself or in some way in the mind. A 
prominent ethical position, which he identifies as Prescriptivist, roots freedom and goodness, in its 
role of commendation.119 Crucial to this position is a necessary chasm between factual properties of 
a thing and its being commended. While such a position can be reduced to grammatical hairsplitting, 	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there is no need to bring too strong a criticism to prescriptivists except to see in them a foil to a 
profoundly teleological and realist ethical system. 
 In a way similar to the searching for a why or purpose as proposed by Germain Grisez, 
McInerny turns to St. Thomas to introduce into the analysis the person, or addressee of the action. 
“I commend something to someone for some reason or other, where by ‘reason’ I do not mean 
motive but the qualities or features the commended thing has.”120 Here we make two observations. 
First, in contrast to the “free” commendation of the prescriptivists, the commendation of the good 
thing is done for a reason with respect to the quality or feature of the thing. Second, and herein a 
real difference emerges between the Thomist and NNL approach, the quality or feature of the thing 
is what in fact dictates or “controls” the action in contrast to a strictly internal algorithm that looks 
to realizations of possible human fulfillment.   
 In looking to the nature, that is the quality and features of a thing, McInerny highlights the 
important distinction made by Peter Geach in an earlier essay between attributive and predicative 
adjectives. Intuitively, and really by means of common sense, people can tell the difference between, 
say, a yellow bird and a good golfer. Yellow is a predicative adjective that describes a physical quality 
of the bird. Whereas good attributively describes the golfer, “that is, in such phrases as ‘good golfer,’ 
‘good typist,’ and so on, it can only be explicated with reference to the role or description under 
which the agent is envisaged.”121 The attribution has very much to do with the quality of the thing, 
especially with respect to its built-in quality of doing or being what we expect from such a thing. A 
sieve, for example, would not rightly be called, or attributed, good as a bowl for water. In fact, it 
would be foolish to attribute goodness to it since its built-in purpose (or teleology) is precisely not to 
hold water. Whereas its quality as a bowl has no attributive connection to whether is it white or blue 
or aluminum or plastic.  	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 Drawing from this distinction, McInerny follows St. Thomas in reflecting then upon person 
qua person. In so doing, he reflects upon those very qualities and actions that make a person human. 
Human acts and moral acts maintain a close relation.122 The human good, in a moral sense, becomes 
“the excellent performance of activities which involve a rational principle.”123 And yet it is important 
to recognize that such a reflection does not limit a person to a series of actions; a reflection of 
person qua person necessarily opens up a hierarchy of acts that progressively reflect a more human 
action. “Performing those well could be said to constitute the human good by a kind of 
synecdoche.”124 Any rational action does not necessarily entail a morally good human action; action 
must be characterized by being done well and virtuously, and thus be ordered to the person’s 
perfection.125 Depraved acts fail to constitute actions that perfect the kind of agent a person is. 
Perfective acts, on the other hand, can be classified in terms of necessity and nobility and they form 
a hierarchical arrangement (a sharp distinction from the incommensurability of the NNL theory].  
 Morality thus derives from pursuing those actions that fulfill or perfect the human agent. 
McInerny stoutly defends the Thomistic position that an ought can be and is derived from an is. Such 
an argument proceeds from recognizing that an agent pursues various goods, or ends, and that, in a 
particular instance, one pursues an action that is judged to have a “goodness” deemed perfective of 
one’s nature. This is, or constitutive quality, of an action is the reason for pursuing the action. 
Should that action be discovered to lack that particular quality of goodness, and instead it is 
discovered to be in an alternate action, then one ought not to pursue the first action and one ought to 
pursue the alternate action.126 In formulating rational activity, it is finally noted that essential, rational 
activity forms a kind of genus under which “the excellences or virtues of rational activity…are the 
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constituents of the human good.”127 A person is a rational animal, and it is precisely the excellence of 
rational activity that perfects a person and makes him or her fully human. 
 Though not in direct continuity with McInerny, Henry Veatch continues to refine and to 
defend the Thomistic understanding of natural law, especially in regards to its distinction from 
ethical deontologism.128 Veatch responds to a continual effort to extract morality from relation to 
the object and the self. By self, I mean an Aristotelian or Socratic appeal to the good life. For 
example, he points to an interpretation by Kurt Baier in which morality arises and is dependent 
upon relations. An isolated man, e.g. Robinson Crusoe, would have no need for morality as his self-
interest would be all that matters.129 Morality  retains nothing of a perfective or fulfilling sense; 
rather, it serves as a kind of relational check. The influence of Immanuel Kant, it seems, holds sway 
over much of the alternative positions that Veatch faces. 
 As the title of Veatch’s article implies, the question of non-moral goods lies at the heart of 
the sharp distinction that is drawn between morality and action. Proponents seek to “achieve an 
impossible best of both worlds, of deontology and of teleology.”130 In being faithful to Kant they 
maintain a strong duty ethic. And yet they try, perhaps unsuccessfully as Veatch judges, to hybridize 
a kind of teleological “non-moral” good into the equation. Without getting too drawn into the 
account of such theories, it is enough to recognize the way in which Veatch reclaims a heuristic 
approach to natural law ethics. The struggle that authors who try to blend the various theories into a 
Kantian framework gives a kind of credence to the perspective of Veatch.131 He uses the Christian 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  127	  Ibid.,	  241.	  128	  Henry	  B.	  Veatch,	  “Are	  There	  Non-­‐Moral	  Goods?,”	  New	  Scholasticism	  52,	  no.4	  (1978):	  471-­‐99.	  129	  Ibid.,	  475.	  130	  Ibid.,	  487.	  131	  In	  a	  twist	  on	  the	  interconnectedness	  of	  morals	  goods	  and	  actions,	  a	  misapplied	  universalizability	  leads	  to	  confusing	  the	  fruit	  of	  good	  deeds	  with	  a	  new	  ethical	  duty:	  “the	  good	  life,	  in	  other	  words,	  will	  have	  to	  be	  acknowledged	  to	  be	  not	  merely	  something	  that	  I	  happen	  to	  like	  or	  to	  tend	  toward	  just	  naturally;	  in	  addition,	  it	  will	  have	  to	  be	  judged	  to	  be	  something	  that	  is	  intrinsically	  good	  or	  worthwhile,	  such	  things	  as	  human	  happiness	  and	  wellbeing	  must	  be	  acknowledged	  to	  be	  legitimate	  ends	  or	  objectives	  for	  others	  no	  less	  than	  for	  me;	  hence	  the	  moral	  obligation	  that	  is	  incumbent	  upon	  me	  to	  seek	  the	  good	  and	  to	  promote	  it	  so	  far	  as	  I	  am	  
	   40	  
command to love God and neighbor to illustrate how right behavior shapes a person. That personal 
happiness and fulfillment follow upon right conduct, Veatch notes, “to have succeeded in bringing 
off what one intended, and to have accomplished one’s purposes, is tantamount to having achieved 
no less than a certain happiness and satisfaction.”132 Against a charge of egoism, Veatch proposes an 
interpretation that reflects a connaturality with action inasmuch as a good action in fact makes one 
good. For it is not the good of happiness or something like that that one seeks; rather, the attaining 
of a desired and worthy end which in itself has worth and is inexorably connected to satisfaction 
preserves the right disposition and approach.  
NNL—TRUTH PERDURES 
 Ten years following the promulgation of Pope Paul VI’s encyclical Humanae Vitae, John C. 
Ford, S.J. and Germain Grisez published an article in Theological Studies in which they did not propose 
a specific interpretation of the arguments for a prohibition of artificial contraception but, instead, 
looked to the infallibility of the teaching and thus the truth of the claim. Their exhaustive analysis of 
historical and scholarly writings on the topic presents a compelling case indeed. However, the 
relevance of the article with respect to our discussion on natural law speaks to their conviction that 
the truth is not contingent upon particular arguments. “The Church cannot change the answer since 
this answer is true. Whatever may be the possibility of a more perfect formulation of the teaching or 
perhaps of its genuine development, there is no possibility that the teaching itself is other than 
substantially true.”133 In fact, it is in her proclamation of the truth that the Church perseveres in her 
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duty to safeguard and to teach “all that is necessary for salvation.”134 An intimate connection is 
established between divine and natural law, especially inasmuch as divine revelation perfects and 
guides interpretation of natural law. Again, this is not to mandate a single, ecclesially-imposed 
interpretation; the truth cannot be cast aside or dismissed or, dare it be said, changed. 
 A further implication of this reality concerns Grisez and the NNL elevation of basic human 
goods. As was observed earlier, these goods being both incommensurate and underived become the 
principles of possibility for all human acts. A conviction of their incommensurability, coupled with 
the just noted insistence upon natural law truths, leads to a necessary system of deliberate choices. 
Germain Grisez spells out very clearly the importance of basic human goods in a brief section on 
the topic within a larger book written in opposition to euthanasia.135 Basic human goods represent 
those incommensurate possibilities for genuine human flourishing. Each, in a way, belongs to that 
truth concerning salvation that the Church safeguards. Perhaps one might take issue with equating 
the importance of life and of play. To overly simplify the discussion, however, risks implicitly 
adopting a “restrictive standard of human goodness.”136 Similarly, and by way of response, the 
opposite tact recognizes that “no single good, nothing promised by any one possible course of 
action, exhausts human possibilities and realizes the whole potentiality for humankind’s 
flourishing.”137 It follows quite readily then, that the system of morality requires an action to respect 
all possible basic goods. Thus any action which through its execution denies any other good its 
intrinsic contribution to human flourishing would involve a moral evil. The truth, indeed, cannot be 
set aside, ignored, or changed. 	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NNL—NEW NATURAL LAW DEFENDED 
 In 1980 English philosopher John Finnis published a book, Natural Law and Natural Rights, in 
which he systematically defended, albeit with some of his own minor corrections, the NNL position 
as first proposed by Germain Grisez. His reflections upon law and upon rights provided a further 
philosophical grounding for the prominent features of the new system, e.g., basic human goods, 
incommensurability, non-inferential understanding. Further, this book provided much of the 
impetus for the more direct engagement and dialogue between Thomism and NNL. Thus we will 
provide some space for a fuller explication of this prominent work. 
 Practical philosophy and reasonableness ground Finnis’ efforts, and such endeavors are to be 
understood as “with a view to decision and action.”138 Thus all efforts directed to right action follow 
from both the thinking and reflecting of the theorist. These efforts look toward a conversion to truly 
reasonable judgments about the good.139 Natural law in particular assists practical reason in its 
concerns about how to act. Human positive law, within which one can and should see a reflection of 
natural law, adds a further nuance in that it is not a mere copy but reflects a profound creativity on 
the part of the author.140  For general theories are more easily reached than specific and concrete 
applications. Finnis looks to St. Thomas as a guide for his approach to the interpretation of law. He 
derives three precepts with respect to man’s knowledge of natural law: first, the most general 
precepts are as ends and thus provide the basic form of the human good; second, these principle can 
be, and often easily are, obscured by various people for a host of reasons; and third, many moral 
questions can only be answered by someone wise who has thought through the issue.141 A firm 
grounding in natural law can thus help to direct toward the end to which practical reason aspires. 
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 At the outset, Finnis makes clear that norms do not derive from facts. In his interpretation 
of both St. Thomas and natural law, he notes: “the first principles of natural law, which specify the 
basic forms of good and evil, and which can be adequately grasped by anyone of the age of reason 
(and not just by metaphysicians), are per se nota (self-evident) and indemonstrable. They are not 
inferred from speculative principles … facts … metaphysical propositions about human nature.”142 
Man’s nature, which the Thomists judged as essential for formulating judgments, serves only as that 
to which goods are applied. Such principles of right and wrong are derived from the first, pre-moral 
principles of practical reason. They are neither inferred nor derived, but neither are they innate. How 
such principles come to be understood is through what Finnis calls “non-inferential understanding” 
by which he means “one grasps that the object of the inclination which one experiences is an 
instance of a general form of the good, for oneself (and others like one).”143 The common fault, as 
Finnis views it, is to apply an overly speculative framework upon a criteria of conformity that looks 
mostly to reasonableness. A sharp distinction between the practical and theoretical reason must be 
maintained. For it is the human good, not human nature, that drives the underived principles of 
practical reason. 
 Finnis stoutly supports the application of basic values and basic practical principles as 
reasons for good action. He uses the example of the good of knowledge to clarify his position. 
Curiosity piques an interest and “it becomes clear that knowledge is a good thing to have (and not 
merely for its utility), without restriction to the subject-matters that up to now have aroused one’s 
curiosity.”144 The truth of knowledge being a good is self-evident. “It cannot be demonstrated, but it 
equally needs no demonstration.”145 There may be many and varied scientific and “natural” cases or 
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indemonstrable truth; rather, they can play a role in seeing the reasonableness. To be well-informed 
is certainly better off than being confused or muddled. The self-evidence of the truth of the good of 
knowledge can be best understood as “a rational judgment about a general form of human well-
being, about the fulfillment of human potentiality.”146  
In a way, based off this simple example, Finnis outlines the list of incommensurable basic 
goods147 that comprise the possibilities of human potential. Each rationally recognized and self-
evident good comprises a basic human value inasmuch as there is a distinction between a good as an 
urge and one following that urge and a good as a basic good which one intelligently pursues for a 
particular realization of a form of the good.148 The virtuous action is thus the way in which one 
pursues particular values that are fitting to a man.  Human psychology, for example, inclines one 
toward a particular good over another. This is neither problematic nor bad. Instead, as the 
fundamental value of each good is maintained, the moral evil comes into play only in cases like 
“patterns of exclusivity,” whereby one good is judged higher and pursued to the direct detriment of 
another.149 An individual can and does choose certain goods as more important, and in so doing does 
not make a value judgment but follows a particular life path—a key feature of Finnis’ system. The 
embracing of a life path exemplifies the right use of freedom. The collected good represent a 
“horizon of attractive possibilities,” and freedom is precisely in choosing in and among those 
goods.150 The happiness that lies in life, that bespeaks its fullness, flows from participation in the 
good. 
To navigate through the plentitude of possible goods, and to choose among them, Finnis 
proposes ten basic requirements of practical reasonableness. They represent the “sorts of reasons 
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why (and thus the way in which) there are things that morally ought (not) to be done.”151 First, 
everyone must establish a rational plan of life. It is general in that it accounts for contingencies, but 
is focused and formative.152 Second, there can be no arbitrary preference among the value, i.e., one 
cannot deny the goodness of the other values.153 Third, nor can there be an arbitrariness among 
people; because a particular preference of well-being can only follow from what reasonableness 
suggests and requires.154 Fourth and Fifth, with respect to all possible life plans, a certain detachment 
is necessary and along the same lines a commitment to one’s particular life plan is essential.155 Sixth, 
though always bearing in mind the follies of consequentialism, there is to be a limited relevance of 
consequence to the extent that an efficiency of action is within reason.156 Seventh, there must be a 
respect for every basic value in every act. To violate such a precept would introduce a 
consequentialist arbitrariness. Of course, there are challenges to the degrees of direct and indirect 
intention and how certain effects concern the intention of the act. He most precisely identifies this 
precept as: “do not choose directly against a basic value.”157 Eighth, one must favor and foster the 
common good of one’s community.158 Ninth, particularly suited to those who are well-formed, this 
precept commands one to follow one’s conscience. “[P]ractical reasonableness is not simply a 
mechanism for producing correct judgments, but an aspect of personal full-being, to be respected in 
every act as well as ‘over-all’—whatever the consequences.”159 The tenth aspect is not so much a 
precept as a product of all these, namely, morality. The various combinations of each factor 
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contribute to the rich understanding of obligation and right in specific and particular cases.160 The 
various factors point ultimately to what is most central to any system: reasonableness.  
The diversity of life plans relates very much to the shared objective of the common good. 
To that end, Finnis makes a great effort to deepen the understanding of friendship and community 
so as to ensure that a complete community emerges—“an all-around association in which would be 
co-ordinated the initiatives and activities of individuals, of families, and of the vast network of 
intermediate associations.”161 Such a system would be crucial to provide for the flourishing of all 
possible life plans. Furthermore, it fosters the common good that underlines practical reason’s 
motivation for a particular point of view of collaboration.162 Always kept in mind are the differences 
or distinctions between values that are participated in but not exhausted—therefore the need for 
community and the common good—and those particular projects that are undertaken and may be 
said to be attained. The former relies upon a collaborative and flourishing community so as to be 
always open to such goods. 
Finnis proceeds with a lengthy treatise on justice, law and authority. A further examination 
of these sections would, perhaps, distract too much from the current endeavor. An example of his 
insights, however, helps to clarify and maintain his consistency with respect to reason.  Amid a 
profound discussion of rights and their claims on us, he recognizes the lack of universal realization 
of his requirements of practical reasonableness among various societies and he declares nonetheless 
that, in keeping with the seventh requirement, “there are absolute human rights.”163 These kind of 
rights are seen as “claim-rights” and as such they are “strictly correlative to duties entailed by the 
requirements of practical reasonableness.”164 As with his other topic, Finnis returns always to the 
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reasonable judgments and shows how such an approach fits within and supports a just and good 
society in which all goods are valued and respected. His goods which, as we recall, followed from 
underived, non-inferential understanding have a cachet and reasonableness to them. For example, 
we as people expect those who teach and preach to us to tell the truth. To deprive a person of 
justice finds little support on its face. And the deliberate killing of innocent life seems to strike all 
people as wrong. 
Obligation, as such, cannot rest simply in the fact of obeying the will of the legislator, or of 
God.165 In concluding in this way following a long chapter on obligation, Finnis does not come to a 
simple or finished conclusion on the obligation derived from the common good. Though he does 
not come to a specific conclusion, he ends his book with a reflection upon nature, reason, and God. 
He can propose that the obligation, that the requirements of practical reasonableness have as their 
point, beyond themselves, a kind of play with God—“that point is the game of co-operating with 
God.”166 Play, as Plato defines it, is precisely that “Free, but patterned expression of life and 
activity.”167 The variety of life plan, the infinite possibilities afforded by the basic goods, these serve 
man in his friendship with God. 
VARIED PATHS 
The kind of allegiance to St. Thomas that marked the theories in the first chapter is falling away as 
the NNL position in particular and through the scholarship of John Finnis assumes a more 
innovative posture.  The “expanding” moral universe within the Church, with respect to moral 
norms, compels each system to tighten its foundation. The Thomists, as illustrated, lean strongly to 
metaphysical realism, ontology, and perfective natures. Meanwhile, the NNL position looks to 
choice and the will as under the direction of practical reason to foster the flourishing of human 	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fulfillment. As mentioned earlier, a real difference emerges between the Thomist and NNL 
approach; the quality or feature of the thing and its consequent shaping of an action contrasts with 
an internal algorithm that looks to realizations of possible human fulfillment. 
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Chapter 3 
DEBATE 
 
While pockets of conversation existed between proponents of the New Natural Law and the 
Thomists prior to the publication of John Finnis’ opus Natural Law and Natural Rights, the period of 
time following its release opened a floodgate of sorts in terms of spirited and contentious debate. 
Thomists like Ralph McInerny, Henry Veatch, and Russell Hittinger challenged specific points, or 
even the theory more universally, of the NNL, and in so doing, concretized the distinct and 
profound differences between the two theories of natural law. The interchange between the two 
groups, which took on great prominence in the 1980s, reveals not only the way in which each theory 
supports its claims, but also demonstrates how faithful Catholics struggle to exercise their ecclesial 
vocations as moral theologians and philosophers. That is, beneath the debate is not merely an 
academic exercise, but a real struggle to authentically and rightly direct moral thought in a way both 
helpful and true to people. This chapter follows, closely and sequentially, some important exchanges, 
and highlights significant difference between the two theories. We turn now to the Thomists to 
begin. 
Thomist—BASIC PRINCIPLES 
Very soon after Finnis’ publication, Ralph McInerny presented a paper to the Natural Law 
Institute meeting in which he looked critically at both Grisez’s foundational interpretation of St. 
Thomas’ treatise on law168 and at Finnis’ appropriation of and deviation from St. Thomas. In so 
doing he aimed to guide the listener and reader toward a reading of Finnis and Grisez that respected 
the fullness of St. Thomas’ teaching. In both complimenting and critiquing their work, McInerny 	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concluded: “Perhaps I will not be thought too docile a disciple of Aquinas if I say that I find Grisez 
and Finnis at their best when they are developing Thomas’ thought along its own lines and weakest 
when they are consciously or unconsciously deviating from it.”169 To his critique, then, we now turn. 
By way of introduction, and perhaps as an opening volley against the NNL position, 
McInerny notes that St. Thomas, a promoter of natural law, takes a position that “there are a 
number of true directives of human action every person can easily formulate for himself.”170 This 
ease comes from the particular and real participation that each rational creature has in the eternal 
law, or wisdom of God, by which Creation is governed. This participation recognizes, in an 
underived and self-evident way, the good that the mind grasps. At first, the underived nature of the 
good may harken to the NNL insistence on the same characteristic with respect to basic goods. As 
McInerny explains, however, this is not the case. Just as in the theoretical use of the mind one 
immediately apprehends being and, consequently, the judgment of the first indemonstrable 
principle—non-contradiction—is self-evident, so too does the practical function grasp first the 
good. “The ‘good’ does not simply designate an object of pursuit, it suggests the formality under 
which the object is pursued: as completive, as perfective.”171 This formality suggests a deep and 
formative teleology built into human nature. McInerny thus highlights in Thomas’ first precept of 
practical reason the adverb naturaliter172 so that he might recognize the immediacy of practical 
reason’s apprehending.173 What he means is perhaps more directly stated by Thomas Gilby in a 
footnote to his translation of that portion of the Summa wherein he writes: “[it is] recognized by the 
practical reason of itself: naturaliter apprehendit, apprehends of its nature, not just because it is told. 	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The argument is putting forward natural law as part of the spring of moral activity, not as an 
inventory of acts to be done or avoided.”174 The in-built teleology of the human nature directs this 
precept, or power. 
 The ends or goods that are the object of a person’s inclinations, and to which practical 
reason pursues, have built into them a natural ordering or hierarchy. In differentiating the three 
orders of good—life, procreation and education of offspring, and truth—McInerny distinguishes the 
levels of participation that persons have to each, i.e., “there are some goods which men share with 
all creatures, others they share with only some other creatures, and some which are peculiar to 
men.”175 As rational animal, the human person acts as a human inasmuch as any movement toward a 
good is engaged “consciously and purposefully and responsibly.”176 Reason guides actions. In so 
doing, it also orders the goods; they are not incommensurate. Thus natural law and its precepts, as 
interpreted by McInerny, are the conjoining of “general injunctions to pursue the ultimate end or 
human good” and “the truth that man’s end is given.”177 Two features stand out in contraposition to 
the NNL theorists. First, the ultimate end, or the human good, necessarily implies a hierarchy; the 
lesser goods must serve the greater. Second, the truth of the end already being given, and thus able 
to be known, informs human nature to itself. 
 Having made some fundamental stances with respect to his own interpretation of St. 
Thomas and of natural law, McInerny proceeds to draw out the differences espoused by Grisez, 
Finnis, et al. He criticizes three claims: first, an unnecessarily strict distinction between fact and value; 
second, an emphasis on pre-moral, not-yet-ethical matters; and third, a denial of any kind of 
ordering or hierarchy of goods and value.178 
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 In the first critique, McInerny asserts that Finnis and Grisez build a system on the belief that 
no duty or obligation can be inferred from propositions about a person’s nature. And further, the 
general form of the good is inferred from a simple act of non-inferential understanding.179 He thus 
accuses the NNL position of being overly fastidious. By way of making his point, he observes 
several common sense approaches and movements from fact to value, from is to ought. For example, 
“Knowledge is good for man entail[s] men ought to pursue knowledge.”180 In their diligence to 
avoid any kind of fallacy, Grisez and Finnis cannot identify the basic value of “knowledge is good 
for man” as a fact and built-in to the constitutive nature of man. McInerny makes the case that, for 
any reasonable, thinking person, such a fact can readily and easily be understood as an example of a 
good that all people seek. Therefore, the movement from is to ought is neither disruptive nor 
incongruous with moral reasoning. 
 Moving to his second critique, the underived first principles are pre-moral. Such a suggestion 
leads to the conclusion that “the comprehensive good that is to be pursued is not a moral value.  
That comes down to saying that man’s ultimate end is not a moral value.”181 Morality arrives by way 
of prescribing, i.e., judging that some action would be a way of attaining the basic value or good 
sought. Moral value follows the judgment, and not the conceptualization.182 McInerny finds fault 
with this terminology and approach.  He points to the distinction between the first and second level 
of natural law precepts. The first St. Thomas calls comunissima. These are most common and thus 
most general.183 Finnis and Grisez have the right kind of intuition in recognizing their generality.  
They are wrong, according to McInerny, in thereby identifying them as pre-moral. St. Thomas, he 
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contends, rightly observes that they do still direct or point to the end, and as such, are absolute and 
changeless.184 They are not waiting to be judged; rather, they birth a deep teleology. The second level 
of precepts, which are deduced from the first, point to specific means and may be more properly 
called by many “precepts.” In the broader view, however, the first level is no less a precept than the 
second. 
 The third and final critique concerns a basic value egalitarianism.185 In recognizing the basic 
goods or values to be underived, indemonstrable, and self-evident, Finnis rightly equates all the 
goods and finds fault in St. Thomas’ ordering: “Thomas here sets a questionable example and [he, 
Finnis,]repeats that ‘in ethical reflection the threefold order should be set aside as an irrelevant 
schematization.’”186 In response, McInerny questions whether such a radical egalitarianism is actually 
necessary; namely, protecting against an instrumentalization of a good, an objective hierarchy does 
not evidently demean any particular good. In fact, in as much as St. Thomas and Aristotle judge 
contemplation to be the highest good, the less objective goods do not diminish but enhance this 
good. “In this perspective, the moral virtues are taken to be dispositive toward, conditions of, the 
contemplative use of the mind.”187 
NNL—BASIC PRINCIPLES 
 John Finnis and Germain Grisez offer a reply to the critiques in the following volume of the 
same journal in which Ralph McInerny’s paper was published. They respond to each of his three 
areas of concern. By way of introducing their reply, they seek first to resolve what they see as 
misunderstandings expressed by McInerny (and held by many others), and second, they remind the 
reader of the limited scope of the two works criticized, i.e., Grisez’s 1965 commentary on a 	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particular question of the Summa and Finnis’ 1980 book on natural law and rights.188 In so doing, 
they both correct the improper interpretation and further clarify their own position. 
 They respond strongly and directly to the criticism of the first objection. They maintain their 
stance concerning non-inferential understanding while recognizing that, indeed, insight comes both 
from observation, memory, and experience—on the one hand—and from felt inclinations and 
knowledge of possibilities—on the other.189 In other words, facts and real conditions provide the 
strata in which judgment takes place, but “judgment itself is derived from no other judgment 
whatsoever.”190 They ground all their practical thinking in light of the first practical principle: good is 
to be done and pursued.191 It is the practical reason itself that guides either precept or imperative. 
They contend that any theoretical knowledge with respect to truths of human nature (re: 
“metaphysical anthropology”) have no normative implications. Therefore any factual or real 
condition of human life or nature can influence but not command moral decision-making. Such an 
influence belongs only to the principles of practical reasoning: “there can be no valid deduction of a 
normative conclusion without a normative principle, and thus that first practical principles cannot be 
derived from metaphysical speculations.”192 Theoretical reasoning is neither logically nor intuitively 
prior to practical reason. 
 In defending their pre-moral analysis of first principles, they immediately note that McInerny 
seems to conflate the bonum (good) of St. Thomas’ first principle with the final or ultimate good. In 
such a construction, every good is ordered to and derivative of that ultimate end. They remark, “it is 
by no means clear or even likely that Thomas considers all the goods to which man is naturally 
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inclined to be constitutive of man’s ultimate end.”193 Instead, they note that it is practical reason in its 
principles that must do and pursue a good. They take issue with McInerny’s presentation of their 
conception of the pre-moral; they reinforce their position that these principles underlie reasoning 
about good and evil actions. They are not pre-moral in a proportionalist sense. No, they are “aspects 
of the full-being of human persons, aspects essentially immeasurable and incommensurable.”194 That 
is, they represent possibilities or potentialities whereby fuller expression of human being may be 
pursued. 
 In criticizing McInerny on this point, the authors claim that he does not fully treat or 
appreciate Grisez’s treatment of the first principles of morality. To educate the reader, they point to 
previously written works. One such work, Grisez and Shaw’s Beyond the New Morality: The 
Responsibilities of Freedom, we considered in the previous chapter. We return, for a moment, to this 
book so as to draw out anew the NNL treatment of first principles.  
 As the relationship between good and ought is being developed, the authors recognize, in a way 
similar to the Thomist interpretation, that things exist in various states of act and potency. Without 
using the same phraseology, e.g., potency, they speak of possibility, that is, things that are not quite 
“all they can be.” They do not, however, connect the possibility with an inherent teleology in the 
nature that demands an “obligatory” fulfillment. In fact, “we are not, however, leading up to the 
conclusion that moral goodness means fulfilling one’s possibilities, while moral badness is failure to 
fulfill possibilities.”195 Such a contrast begins with the use of possibility, rather than potentiality. One 
might, for example, act and turn out evil, and in so doing, he or she would be very much, and really, 
fulfilling a possibility within him or herself. Thus, it is with respect to possibility that morality 
emerges. By way of a tentative definition of morality, the authors propose an action that fosters 	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more and more human being. Human freedom and morality concern themselves with human choice. 
That is, “the moral ‘ought’ thus points toward full and fuller freedom of self-determination, and 
ultimately, to the fullest possible self-determination.”196 Practical reason takes control of morality, 
then, as these basic values do not represent desirable states of affairs (they do not oblige inasmuch 
as they perfect the person). Instead, they manifest aspects or “perspectives” on the full-being of the 
human person. An exclusivist choice, i.e., one in which other basic values or goods are thus 
devalued, stands as the immoral act. Whereas an inclusivist choice, i.e., “a person who chooses in 
this way an effect acknowledges his own limitations—no one can be or do everything—but he does 
not shift the blame, as it were, onto the options-not-chosen by denying their value”197 represents a 
moral act. Goods and actions can thus be seen as pre-moral inasmuch as they, in themselves, do not 
oblige particularly. It is the mind, to use the Grisezian term, which calls the turn.198 
 With respect to the denial of objective hierarchy among the basic goods, Finnis and Grisez 
contend that St. Thomas’ three-fold ordering199 does not of itself even imply a hierarchy. They 
identify in McInerny what they see as “a degree and a kind of Aristotelianism”200 not reflective of 
their interpretation of St. Thomas. They do not see all the goods as shaped by reason, but as 
“naturally understandable by reason.”201 Furthermore, beyond failing to see for themselves an objective 
hierarchy in St. Thomas, they assert that if one were to find one, they would reject such a hierarchy. 
They contend that incommensurability and the transcendence of the good of the first principle of 
practical reason not only characterizes their system, but also serves to make it philosophically and 
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theologically true.202 While St. Thomas should be encouraged and used as inspiration and support, 
autonomous and independent work must be done, according to Grisez and Finnis. 
Thomist—BASIC PRINCIPLES 
 Less than two years after his brief exchange with Finnis and Grisez, Ralph McInerny 
published an introduction to moral theology/philosophy in light of St. Thomas, Ethica Thomistica, in 
which he takes up again both his interpretation of natural law and his critique of the NNL theorists. 
Much of the book’s content reinforces, or goes beyond and in depth with respect to, the 
interpretation of natural law briefly expounded upon above. There is no need, then, to repeat his 
common themes. Several points bear mentioning. 
 By way of laying the groundwork for his teleological framework of natural law, McInerny 
seeks after an understanding of the specific good of human nature, one’s ultimate end. Turning first 
to Aristotle, he finds in the philosopher a recognition that the distinctly human action exhibits a 
rational principle. “He [Aristotle] insists on the ambiguity of the phrase ‘rational activity.’ Activity 
can be called rational or human either because it is the activity of reason itself or because it is an 
activity of some faculty other than reason which comes under the sway of reason.”203 It follows that 
Aristotle, and the Christian tradition, looks to human action intimately relating itself to reason as the 
specificity of man as a “rational” animal. Thus, as he probes further into this ultimate end, he 
concludes that it is indeed one. Though, such an end is not one in a unitary sense, as if there is only 
one particular action that comprises happiness. Rather, as St. Thomas expands upon Aristotle, he 	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  of	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  only	  by	  a	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  into	  the	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  human	  action	  would	  be	  impossible	  and	  where	  faith	  would	  replace	  natural	  law	  rather	  than	  supplement	  it”(Ibid.,	  30).	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identifies the bonum, or goodness, as that end, particularly inasmuch as the good perfects the agent.204 
Formally considered, all people thus pursue the same end…goodness. Every action and choice to 
embrace a good that perfects, or which is falsely thought to perfect, proves this intuition. The 
Christian, seeing more clearly with the graced eyes of faith, sees “God who is goodness itself [as] the 
only object that can exhaust the formality under which we desire and act.”205 The variety of life, and 
especially of a life well lived, manifests, in a real way, the infinite beatitude of God. The saints, those 
who most perfectly embraced their humanity, prove the immensity and diversity of realizations and 
defy the fear of a kind of Christian homogeneity.206 
 As McInerny views the three levels of inclination and their consequent goods, he observes 
that they are goods for humans inasmuch as they are humanized—“insofar as they are pursued, not 
just instinctively, but as the aim or goal of conscious human action.”207 Natural law precepts direct 
or order action toward the good that perfects the person. In a defense of sorts against an accusation 
of physicalism, McInerny emphasizes this point to show that every action draws from the object 
itself and moves toward an end both intended and prescribed by the act/object itself. Each act 
moves toward its particular end that cannot be fully extracted from the ultimate end; such an 
assertion grounds natural law in the real and elevates it about the particular: “It is because 
recognition of the ultimate end is implicit in every human action that Thomas can hold that natural 
law is valid for all men and at all times.”208 
 McInerny returns to a direct critique of Grisez and Finnis in the conclusion of his chapter 
on natural law. Though he admits in the bibliographic notes that “this book was already in proof 
before I became aware of their response [analyzed above] and thus I am unable to give it the 
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attention it deserves here. The two authors now seem reluctant to be assessed in terms of fidelity to 
St. Thomas. That, of course, was the angle from which I read them.”209 There are, however, different 
emphases in his critique that explain further his theory and distinguish it from that of the NNL 
theorists. 
 To better understand the dynamics of practical knowledge, McInerny turns to St. Thomas’ 
question on God’s knowledge in his Summa.210 Therein, a three-fold account of speculative 
knowledge, and by extension practical knowledge, is presented. In summation, the three criteria211 in 
reference to practical knowledge are: first, “with respect to the object,” practical has to do with 
those things that are producible (operabilia) by the knower; second, “with respect to the mode of 
knowing,” practical has to do with those producible things known as produced and not as reflected 
upon in general—it may be called prescriptive or recipe mode; and third, “the intent of the knower,” 
practical concerns the actual making or doing of the producible object.212 In outlining the three 
criteria, McInerny distinguishes degrees or kinds of practical knowledge. Thus the most or 
“perfectly” practical kind of reasoning is the kind that encompasses all three criteria. The other two 
possible variants, i.e., those that may not satisfy the practical criteria with respect to the second or 
the second and the third, necessarily include a theoretical element. The interplay among the 
variations in action develop, granted such a schema has a kind of artificiality to it, from practical in 
the first alone (“virtually” practical) to practical in the first two (“formally” practical). These two 
degrees represent any “account of the good,” and “moral judgments.”213 The “completely” practical 
knowledge “the knowledge incarnate in action, is presupposed by moral philosophy and is what it 
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remotely aims to guide.”214  The admission of degrees does not imply a physical separation; rather it 
elaborates upon the fullness of practical reason. McInerny cannot, therefore, condone a system (like 
that proposed by the NNL) that divorces the two connected types of knowledge as if either extreme 
embodied moral philosophy in total. 
 He repeats in the book the relation of theoretical to practical knowledge by means of the 
same example of knowledge being good for man mentioned above. He emphasizes in this account 
both that Grisez and Finnis recognize the first statement as being a metaphysical one—that does not 
have anything to do with practical knowledge—and that human actions contain within them, in their 
natures, the very ought or command to do them.215 How these two moral imperatives apply concerns 
a reflection upon the criteria just mentioned. “We have seen that the ratio boni is something 
recognized by reflecting on ourselves as already acting.”216 The statement relates to the perfection of 
the person and reveals itself, “as already acting,” i.e., the theoretical presupposes the purely practical 
and, in a sense, guides or directs it.  
NNL—THE WAY OF THE LORD JESUS CHRIST 
 Germain Grisez also published a book very soon thereafter.217 While he does not address 
Ralph McIntyre in the same direct manner, his writings further separate his NNL approach from 
that of the Thomists. The format of the nearly 2800 page work presents questions and answers. In 
looking at a few questions from the first volume, Christian Moral Principles, we might discover quite 
clearly the prominent NNL positions. 
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 Grisez asks in what sense free choice might be understood as a principle of morality. He 
clarifies that it is not a normative principle but a moral one in “a wide sense.”218 In this wide sense, 
free choice “is an existential principle, a source of both moral good and moral evil.”219 For it is the 
free choice that provides moral norms a venue or power in which to operate. It is the activity of the 
free choice that makes an action morally good or evil, because it is the deliberate and considered-all-
possibilities choice that reflects and consents upon the action.220 Choice implies that we might have 
chosen otherwise; consequently, the one who freely chooses is responsible. “Human persons are 
historical beings who day by day build themselves up by their free choices. One shapes one’s own 
life, one determines one’s self, by one’s free choices.”221 
 The fourth chapter of his book addresses inadequate moral theories and herein he places a 
critique of his interpretation of the classical scholastic (e.g., Thomist) natural law theory. Grisez 
identifies the foundation of the scholastic position as the objectivity of moral norms as founded 
upon intellectually known (re: theoretical knowledge) human nature. He perceives human nature as 
being a given reality and morality as being a relation to it: “knowing whether or not an action 
conforms with human nature is a matter of making a comparison…when the action is compatible 
with human nature, the judgment registers conformity.”222 In consequently rejecting this approach to 
moral reasoning by means of appealing to the Humean is-ought fallacy, Grisez restricts nature to a 
static reality. He desires to specify or distinguish human nature as different from any other kind of 
nature. He appeals to a dynamism: “it is not human nature as a given, but possible human fulfillment 
which must provide the intelligible norms for free choice.”223 Amid so static a nature, he charges the 
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scholastic model with being able to provide negative precepts, but unable to offer much in terms of 
positive incentives for flourishing.224 Grisez, it must be noted, does not attack the classical scholastic 
method for the sake of substituting an original system. In his question concerning the classical 
method, he found fault, ultimately and historically, in the method’s inability to address adequately 
the condemnation of contraception; “it provided only question-begging arguments for specific 
norms of Christian morality.”225 Such insufficiency fails to honor the responsibility and role of moral 
theology; namely, “it reflects upon the truths of faith…to make clear how faith should shape 
Christian life, both the lives of individual Christians and the life of the Church.”226 
 To return again and to touch for a moment upon the pre-moral goods, Grisez states clearly 
that “the principles of practical reasoning considered so far do not tell us what is morally good. 
Rather, they generate the field of possibilities in which choices are necessary.”227 Our looking anew 
at this topic is not mere repetition. No, further insight emerges as Grisez upholds his position and 
defends the coming to knowledge of the basic human goods. Grisez and the NNL theorists 
customarily distinguish practical from theoretical knowledge. Not that there is no exchange between 
the two; instead, the former does not derive from and depend upon the latter in terms of morals. 
The emphasis on the pre-moral and the primacy of practical knowledge hinges precisely upon the 
point that these basic goods are possibilities and not actualities. “Just as theoretical thought by its 
very nature is thinking that-it-is, so practical thinking by its very nature is thinking that-is-would-be-well-
to-be.”228 Goodness is commonly only understood “insofar as something is realized or is threatened 
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and needs to be protected.”229 Grisez is being honest and obedient to his reading of St. Thomas’ first 
principle of practical reason that states “good is to be done and pursued” and not “do the good.” 
Insofar as the basic values or goods are recognized, they truly represent the fullness of possibilities 
for human flourishing. They are good in their right actualization. By means of a simple example, 
taking the enjoyment of golf, Grisez remarks: “in the simplest kind of action, the only relevant good 
actually affected is that actualized in the state of affairs brought about in carrying out the choice.”230 
With respect to the other possibilities, and not detracting from them, one determines oneself in 
choosing this action. One chooses and embraces a good. In so doing, one leaves open, to the extent 
possible, all future possibilities and goods. 
Thomist— “IS”-“OUGHT” 
 Very soon after the exchange among McInerny, Grisez, and Finnis began, a similar debate 
emerged between the NNL theorists and Georgetown Professor Emeritus Henry Veatch. A 1981 
issue of the Catholic Lawyer published this discussion. As Veatch’s article is read first we will begin 
with his.231 
 Following his complimenting Oxford Don John Finnis for nearly single-handedly restoring a 
philosophical pride of place for natural law by means of his book Natural Law and Natural Rights, 
Veatch begins a critique with a simple and traditional interrogative: “how can the enterprise of a 
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natural-law ethic be anything other than a search for some basis for morals and ethics in nature 
itself, and thus in the facts of nature?”232 in so doing he poses his criticism of the Grisez and Finnis 
model of moral reasoning, NNL, in terms of a curious dilemma. Either Finnis must yield to the 
Humean is-ought “fallacy,” thereby endearing himself and his position to his Oxford peers while, at 
the same time, necessarily proposing an ethics that cannot rightly be called natural-law. Or he must 
overcome the fallacy and see in it its own falsehood and thus recognize the naturalness of natural 
law. At issue, beneath all of this, is a proper grounding of natural law ethics. 
 Veatch looks first to understand the relationship between ethics and metaphysics in terms of 
deducibility or inferability.233 In so doing, he draws an analogy to the relation between physics and 
metaphysics. Each science certainly maintains its own autonomy and intelligibility, and one is not 
merely reduced into the other. And yet metaphysics, the study of being or ens, is necessary if one is 
to move on to and to think about physics, ens mobile. Physics, it can be said, presupposes the 
metaphysical realism of the thing examined or thought about.234 Metaphysics does not exhaust or 
even imply much of the knowledge of physics, but it can be said to be the basis upon which 
Aristotle’s physics is based. Applied to ethics, then, Veatch asserts that metaphysics, or an account 
of ens as a good, cannot be ignored; at the same time, the autonomy of ethics and its own first 
principles can and must be appreciated. In this way he admits that there is a way in which one might 
state that ethics are not inferable from metaphysical considerations, but he cannot condone a 
conclusion that radically separates the two.235 
 A look at human nature follows. Veatch demands that the difference between static and 
dynamic human nature be acknowledged, and in so doing, exposes the kind of straw man against 
which the NNL position rejects the use of human nature. The common conception of nature, 	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proceeding from the modern era and looking to physical sciences for inspiration, depicts a static case 
of being, as if a person’s nature were equivalent to a fixed mathematical equation. The is-ought fallacy 
rightly sees such a nature as unable to conjure any kind of precept. But such a nature fails utterly to 
depict human nature as it really is, namely, a seat of potentialities and dynamic change, “and 
therefore one who is not all that he might be or could be, and whose present or actual condition 
needs always to be compared with that which he might be or could be.”236 That which a person 
might or could be compels an ought. Thus any reference to a person cannot be made with a static 
view. That is, it must always look to the end, which is the fulfillment or embracing of the good to 
which the nature is ordered. “The very ‘is’ of human nature has been shown to have an ‘ought’ built 
into it.”237 The in-built teleology of nature points to the implicit ought within it. It follows that natural 
law precepts would reflect this truth in directing action toward that which perfects a nature, and 
against actions that would thwart or oppose the fulfillment of nature. Against Finnis and Grisez, 
Veatch proposes that any hold-up or uneasiness with regard to an is-ought fallacy finds no foothold 
amid a proper understanding of nature.238 
 Veatch takes further issue with Grisez’s sharp distinction between practical and theoretical 
science, due to Grisez’s radical separation between the two. In so doing, Veatch invokes “the 
Euthyphro test,” by which he means the question posed by Socrates regarding the foundation of a 
thing being good: beloved because it is good, or good because it is beloved. He accuses Grisez of 
stopping short of grounding that which is good; i.e., Grisez stops at the level of inclination, and thus 
leaves open an ambiguous interpretation.239 Certainly Veatch would credit Grisez with grounding his 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  236	  Ibid.,	  258.	  237	  Ibid.,	  258.	  238	  He	  does	  concede	  that	  many	  natural	  law	  moralists	  still	  employ	  a	  static	  model,	  and	  as	  such	  fall	  victim	  to	  the	  fallacy’s	  accusation.	  A	  correct	  vision,	  however,	  still	  must	  face	  the	  overwhelming	  incorporation	  of	  a	  static	  view	  “for	  this	  is	  the	  way	  in	  which	  nearly	  all	  modern	  philosophers	  from	  Descartes	  and	  Hobbes	  have	  tended	  to	  understand	  such	  a	  notion	  as	  the	  ‘natures’	  of	  things.	  Modern	  natural	  scientists	  have	  merely	  followed	  suit”(Ibid.,	  259).	  239	  Ibid.,	  261-­‐2.	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ethics in something beyond mere subjective inclination. “They must be construed to mean that they 
are objects of inclination in the sense of being things that we ought to be inclined towards, or should 
be inclined towards, whether we actually are or not.”240 Veatch contends that in order to fully 
understand and to ground the goodness in the thing itself, a metaphysical approach must be taken. 
Such an approach invokes potency and act and looks toward the transcendentals, e.g., goodness and 
truth. The metaphysical foundation is the only way to avoid the ambiguity of the Euthyphro test and 
keep ethics from being grounded in simple inclination. Such a view toward the metaphysical 
grounding identifies the goods that truly perfect the human person. Absent such an approach, or 
keeping the theoretical and practical separated by a sharp wall, any goods fail to find a firm 
foundation. He sees in Grisez an implicit denial of theoretical reasoning occurring; practical reason 
itself cannot formulate the truth, especially in a self-evident way. Perhaps sophisticated 
argumentation can achieve such an end, but Veatch admits himself a “rustic”241 in terms of any such 
argument. 
NNL— “IS”-“OUGHT” 
 In his defense against the “sharp questions” posed by Henry Veatch, John Finnis begins by 
rejecting the questions and objections offered by Veatch. He appeals to a deeper and more reasoned 
approach. In fact, he advises that his book indeed responds to the kind of interpreters of St. Thomas 
and Aristotle that are represented by people like Veatch.242 He firmly and adamantly contends that 
neither deduction nor inference can arrive at value—“understanding of value was then shown to 
function as a principle of practical reasoning.”243 The value determined is realized to be a possible 
way to participate in the intelligible and general form of good. Finnis does not claim to simply 	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submit to an “Oxfordian” insistence upon avoiding any commission of the is-ought fallacy; he 
acknowledges the “logically significant distinction” posed by an is-ought relation, and at the same time 
affirms the indemonstrability and per se nota quality of basic principles of practical reason.244 
 Finnis contends that his system does in fact ground ethical reasoning and does not suffer 
from a kind of subjective inference or induction. He acknowledges that initial inclinations and 
movements can spur on actions, but that inclination does not ground moral value in any way. The 
value follows from a rational judgment “about a general form of human well-being, about the 
fulfillment of a human potentiality.” The human potentiality draws upon a teleological framework, 
whereas the application derives from rational judgment. This rational judgment is not merely 
arbitrary but concerns both well-being and participation in all aspects of well-being; it does not 
violate any basic goods. Emphasis lies on possibility; the more one chooses actions that embrace 
basic goods, the more one becomes what he or she can be.245 Such directing toward realization of 
being preserves the system from falling into subjective desire. 
 Furthermore, Finnis takes issue with Veatch’s claim that practical reason necessarily relies 
upon theoretical thinking. He refers to his challenge in his book in which he asserts: “there is much 
to be said for the view that the order of dependence was precisely the opposite—that the 
teleological conception of nature was made plausible, indeed conceivable, by analogy with the 
introspectively luminous, self-evident structure of human well-being, practical reasoning, and human 
purposeful action.”246 That is not to say that it is some subjective experience that determines value; 
such a push toward inclination was already rejected. Instead, what Finnis calls a “simple act of non-
inferential understanding” is what takes hold of an object of inclination and judges it to be an 
instantiation of the general form of the good. He recognizes this action to be one of practical reason 	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and hence it does not depend upon theoretical reason. As such no metaphysical explanation is 
necessary. 
 He follows with a strong argument that Veatch, unbeknownst to himself, makes the case for 
the same practical priority. He begins by acknowledging that both practical and theoretical reasoning 
are different operations within the same intellectual faculty.247 Practical reason differs precisely in 
understanding “ human good and what is worthwhile for humans to have, do, and be is attained 
when one considers that it is good to be, have, and do and thus what it is worthwhile to have, do, 
and be.”248 Within such a definition, Veatch, Finnis claims, argues a purely practical argument. The 
hypothetical situation in which “theoretical reasoning” occurs is actually practical, inasmuch as it 
proposes a choice between alternative lives, i.e., what it is worthwhile for humans to be. As further 
support of Finnis’ insistence upon the primacy of practical reasoning, he points to St. Thomas 
whom he interprets as rejecting the claim (as maintained by interpreters like Veatch) that practical 
reason and prudence “are concerned only with particulars (not universal truth) and means (not 
identification of ends).”249 Finnis continually asserts that his system both recognizes the practical 
truth expounded by St. Thomas—against an undue emphasis on theoretical reasoning—and 
presents itself as intelligible without recourse to metaphysical principles.250 
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Chapter 4 
CONTENTION 
 
1987 
 As the discussions between the Thomists and the NNL theorists continued throughout the 
1980s, 1987 stands as a transformative year with respect to the debates. Significant works from both 
sides emerged. Grisez, Finnis, and Boyle published lengthy articles expanding and clarifying their 
theory. Professor Russell Hittinger, in an achievement dubbed by Henry Veatch as “a veritable God-
send,” published a book-length criticism entitled A Critique of the New Natural Law Theory.251 In the 
first systematic and direct manner, Hittinger judges the NNL position to be, among many things, a 
Kantian theorization.252 To flush out these developments, then, we shall begin with the clarifications 
offered by the NNL theorists and proceed then to Hittinger’s work.  
 A second kind of criticism emerges as well, one that involves accusations of minimalism. 
That is, the Thomists charge the NNL with limiting the full meaning of practical reason, and 
therefore restricting the fulfillment of the human person. Hittinger again leads the way as fresh 
groups of supporters within each camp offer strong defenses of their respective theories. For the 
NNL, professors William May and Robert George play a more prominent role; among the 
Thomists, Steven Long and Henry Veatch.  	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  Professor	  Ernest	  Fortin	  offers	  one	  of	  many	  reviews	  of	  this	  book	  by	  Hittinger.	  In	  his	  review	  he	  credits	  Hittinger	  with	  taking	  on	  a	  theory	  that	  does	  not	  lend	  itself	  easily	  to	  criticism—“[they]	  do	  not	  take	  kindly	  to	  criticism	  and	  rarely	  respond	  to	  it,	  save	  perhaps	  by	  way	  of	  another	  tacit	  reformulation	  of	  their	  positions”(839).	  Fortin	  points	  out	  four	  principle	  criticisms	  launched	  by	  Hittinger	  and	  thus	  provides	  in	  his	  review	  a	  brief	  summation.	  Such	  a	  perspective	  may	  be	  of	  help	  as	  our	  later	  analysis	  may	  succumb	  to	  Hittinger’s	  ambitious	  endeavor	  and	  seem	  as	  though	  we	  are	  taken	  “through	  a	  maze	  of	  intricate	  detail	  from	  which	  we	  eventually	  emerge	  with	  the	  odd	  feeling	  of	  having	  lost	  our	  way	  on	  more	  than	  one	  occasion”(Ernest	  L.	  Fortin,	  review	  of	  A	  
Critique	  of	  the	  New	  Natural	  Law	  Theory,	  by	  Russell	  Hittinger,	  The	  Review	  of	  Metaphysics	  42	  (June	  1989):	  838-­‐41.	  252	  Inasmuch	  as	  it	  suggests	  a	  subjective	  idealism	  and	  depends	  upon	  a	  duty	  bound	  “good	  will.”	  	  
	   70	  
NNL—LAW AND INCLINATIONS 
The first article of Grisez that we will look at offers some clarifications.253 Though not 
definitive in its explanation,254 it is helpful to note a few of Grisez’s comments. First, with respect to 
practical reason, Grisez emphasizes the practical nature of moral thinking as it relates to that which 
is producible or operable by people and to ends given, not by theoretical reasoning, but, “as they are 
given by nature through practical reason’s naturally grasping them as to-be-done.”255 It is made quite clear that 
the end cannot be determined as if in a vacuum, or outside the context of a practical reason judging 
what will be done. Second, and by extension to the previous point, the will is directed by practical 
reason in its first movements toward the good-to-be-done-and-pursued.256 That is, the will plays a 
central role in formulating action, for it is the will that acts; but it is not one superior to practical 
reason—practical reason judges the “appetible-ness” of the good. And third, he further elucidates 
the way in which the basic goods are incommensurable. Against charges that Aristotle and St. 
Thomas argue for one ultimate good for humans, Grisez both refutes the accusation’s interpretation 
of Aristotle and, especially of St. Thomas, and points to the unitary first principle: “integral human 
fulfillment257.  
 Germain Grisez, Joseph Boyle, and John Finnis set out to reformulate further and to defend 
their new natural law theory in a lengthy article published in the American Journal of Jurisprudence, 
wherein they concern themselves with three main topics: practical principles, moral truth, and 
ultimate ends. In so doing, they aimed to respond to criticism and further promote their theory.  
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  61	  (1987):	  307-­‐20.	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  In	  a	  selected	  and	  annotated	  bibliography	  attached	  to	  their	  lengthier	  article,	  the	  NNL	  theorists	  note	  about	  this	  particular	  article:	  “both	  defending	  the	  theory	  against	  misunderstandings	  and	  criticizing	  misinterpretations	  of	  Aquinas.	  Here,	  too,	  the	  constructive	  presentation	  of	  the	  theory	  is	  superseded	  by	  that	  in	  the	  present	  article”	  [Germain	  Grisez,	  Joseph	  Boyle,	  and	  John	  Finnis,	  “Practical	  Principles,	  Moral	  Truth	  &	  Ultimate	  Ends,”	  The	  American	  Journal	  of	  Jurisprudence	  32	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  Ibid.,	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  In expounding upon practical principles the authors begin by emphasizing the supreme 
importance of free choice with respect to human action. The foundation of ethics, about which one 
does not have a choice, concerns the practical principles. Their system therefore cannot be 
adequately labeled teleological nor deontological; herein they explicitly deny a Kantian influence.258 
While certainly related (in ways) to each kind of system, in not falling into either category, the system 
proposes absolute moral norms and holds up morally good free choices as key and, “intrinsic to the 
supreme good of the human person.”259 Consequently, in upholding morally good free choices, their 
system will point also to an incommensurability of basic goods; one single natural end would make 
illusory the important and good free choice. Free choice emphasizes too that it is a desired result or 
goal that drives a reasoned action, rather than a goal serving to shape or be the reason for acting. So it 
is free choice that instantiates at least one good and respects all the basic goods. 
 They employ dialectics to defend the first practical principles. Such tactics illustrate the self-
evidence of the principles; their defense is of the order of proof, “hence the knowledge of these 
practical principles as practical in no way depends upon these theoretical arguments.”260 In laying out 
a series of defenses, the authors try to bring some cooperation of the aspects (theoretical and 
practical) within the unity of reason. These defenses arrive as a kind of litany of reasonableness, e.g., 
large studies of persons with respect to inclinations, when taken as a whole, support an acceptance 
of a list of basic goods, whereas rejecting the list of basic goods is, “at odds with the data.”261 Various 
approaches and data sources further show the reasonableness of the principles of practical reason.  
 Such efforts are undertaken so as not to belabor the point and distinction from theoretical 
reason, but to emphasize and to clarify the first principles of practical reason as underived and per se 
nota. “Is to be” drives practical reason, not “is.” This is not just a linguistic exercise: “it follows that 	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practical knowledge cannot have it truth by conformity to what is known. Rather, a practical 
proposition is true by anticipating the realization of that which is possible through acting in 
conformity with that proposition, and by directing one’s action toward that realization.”262 Human 
nature plays a role inasmuch as it includes the capacity of practical knowledge. Practical knowledge, 
acting through free choice with respect to the basic goods, instantiates human fulfillment through 
these aspects [basic goods]. From these basic goods, then, the emergence of the moral ought appears. 
 Moral ought, or moral truth, demands a fully rational determination of action whereby the 
basic goods, i.e., the is-to-be, does not yet exist in reality, but only as a rational is-to-be. The 
instantiation of what might come to be serves as a normative ought to be with respect to the full 
directedness of the principles of practical reason. The basic goods do not take on moral weight in 
themselves; they are moral, “when the whole set of practical principles works together and 
constitutes the integral directiveness of practical knowledge.”263 To that end, the authors propose a 
full and adequate definition of the first principle of morality: “In voluntarily acting for human goods 
and avoiding what is opposed to them, one ought to choose and otherwise will those and only those 
possibilities whose willing is compatible with a will toward integral human fulfillment.”264 
 The third and final section of the explanatory article focuses on ultimate ends. In simple 
terms this ultimate end, which does not undermine the incommensurability of the basic goods, is 
integral human fulfillment, by which the authors mean the “realization, so far as possible, of all the 
basic goods in all persons, living together in complete harmony.”265 This particular ultimate end 
serves not as a reason, but more of an ideal, and thus it does not in itself constitute a basic good. 
Inasmuch as goods are reasons for acting, the authors insist upon God not being considered the 
ultimate end. They strive to maintain the gift and participation that divine grace entails; they preserve 	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the distinction between divine goodness and human action. There exists, then, a real and natural 
human fulfillment that the basic goods instantiate. God, however, is not to be ignored or excluded; 
rather, as the source of all goodness, he can be seen, in this way, to be the ultimate end as these basic 
goods participate, and are not overwhelmingly dissipated, in God’s goodness. 
 In individual lives, a certain priority (though not hierarchy) emerges as unfettered practical 
reason establishes a natural preference. Just as harmony of living is championed, people formulate a 
plan of life, and such an effort constitutes “a significant part of the happiness for which they are 
prepared to settle.”266 Though not ordered among themselves, various prior decisions and conditions 
of life establish a natural priority among the goods to which the life plan brings order and moral 
value. 
Thomist—A CRITIQUE 
 Russell Hittinger, in this same year, presents his case against the formulation of natural law 
as espoused and presented by the NNL proponents. He offers a sustained critique of essential 
features of the system. As a means of summarizing the Grisez-Finnis system of new natural law, 
Russell Hittinger identifies four criteria, established by Grisez, against which he might evaluate the 
theory: “an adequate moral theory must account for the practicality of practical reason…; must 
account for our relationship to, and interest in, concrete goods…; must show both the distinctions, 
and interrelations, between values and specifically moral norms…; [and] a Catholic moral theology 
must meet all the above requirements, as well as show what specific difference revelation makes for 
morality.”267 
 The Grisez-Finnis criticism of conventional natural law theory derives from a rejection of 
the essential and unchanging view of a human nature that acts as a standard concerning which 	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speculative judgments alone play a role, relegating practical reason to a mere derivative role. Against 
this emphasis, the new theory looks toward possible human fulfillment as the key to, and solution 
of, the problem. Thus the theory, and with it the first principle of practical reason, as noted above, is 
directive to action, and not a description of good and evil. “In other words, practical reason is not 
theoretical reason caught up in what might be termed a practical moment. It’s capacity of being 
directed to a work indicates that what is under consideration is not so much the given, but the mind 
charting what is to be.”268 Thus, the theory pits natures against possibilities. And the basic goods are 
not innate but self-evident to practical reason as they instantiate potentials. They are not givens but 
values and possibilities. The universality of the moral norms flows from the action of practical 
reason and not speculative reasoning. “The evidence is given in the exercise of practical reason, and 
to look elsewhere is to miss the point.”269 
   Hittinger immediately takes note of the idealism270 of the Grisez-Finnis system. Such a 
system aims, as he and the authors note, to keep at bay the contention of the consequentialists. In 
the constant effort to remain “open” to goods, Hittinger sees a “Kantian-like emphasis on 
respect”271 that distinguishes the system very much from St. Thomas and a Thomist natural law. He 
uses the example of love to express the emphasis upon which a good-fulfilling-the-person (bonum 
mihi) that a NNL approach centers in contrast to the more inclusive focus upon St. Thomas’ grasp 
of lover and beloved; i.e., reason judges the good for me as situated in a hierarchical world in which 
that kind of love, naturally, is appropriate. Consequently, virtues, as traditionally expounded, do not 	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have a considerable role in choosing and action, nor as being constitutive of the thing.272 The 
reliance upon attractive possibility to establish norms leaves, as Hittinger claims, the NNL position 
open to criticism against which it does not have the theoretical apparatus to contend.  
 In terms of goods, the single end or ergon (that is, an ordering and directing of all goods 
toward the one good) approach expounded by Aristotle is summarily rejected by the NNL theory, 
the incommensurability of basic goods having been established many times earlier. And Hittinger 
suggests that the theory “implies the good of the self is ontologically coterminous with the range of 
goods.”273 Such would seem to be the case, considering especially the emphasis on openness to 
possibilities. The danger, however, lies in valuing people in terms of their fullness of possibilities, 
i.e., to the extent that some goods are not realized—and this would necessarily be the case as people 
are finite creatures—then the real and ontological value of the person would be diminished. This 
discussion of goods brings to light the key distinction that Hittinger judges between the NNL 
position and St. Thomas. Though in partial agreement with Aquinas’ fourfold relation of order and 
reason, Grisez excludes the introductory remarks with respect to order in things: “first, the order of 
‘parts of a totality,’ and second, the order of ‘things to and end,’ which is of ‘greater importance than 
the first.’”274 Though not extraordinarily complex, the two principles speak to the reality and 
goodness being “in” the object—a point about which the NNL theorist and Thomists disagree. 
 As Hittinger’s discussion moves to religion, his identification of a strong Kantian deontology 
within the NNL position emerges, along with a reliance upon a pronounced fideism.275 The Grisez-
Finnis model produces an altered (and fideist?) norm of the first principle of morality: “one ought to 
will those and only those possibilities which contribute to the integral human fulfillment being realized in the fulfillment 	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of all things in Jesus.”276 Within such a new paradigm, they then struggle to distinguish between 
ordinary morality and theological morality. It becomes difficult to see if there is any difference; and 
the resolution to this tension offered by the NNL theory offers a kind of “motivational appeal” 
wherein the potential for the fullness of possibility is acknowledged, and openness to such goods 
gives power over inclinations to evil. “The goods, as categorical, are no longer in a holding patterns, 
but are viewed as concrete in the kingdom of God.”277 Implied therefore is that it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to have genuine and full morality without faith. The basic goods, it might be perceived, 
are like Platonic forms abiding in the bosom of Abraham or within the Kingdom of God. With 
respect to the sphere of religion—as one of the basic goods—Hittinger takes issue with the flat and 
static way in which the NNL theory does not weigh commitment to God as something different and 
greater; rather, it is part of a life plan.278 The theory seemingly cannot decide whether it cedes a kind 
of hierarchy in choosing a divine good over a human good, or whether it risks turning a human 
good into an instrumental one. In the desire to avoid consequentialist thinking, and in line with such 
kinds of thinking as the Kantian antinomies, Hittinger contends an error in “Grisez’s method of 
absorbing ethics into revealed religion in order to reposit ethics in its ‘natural’ state…For Grisez, 
however, faith makes up for a certain deficiency in the motivation that ought to be at work without 
faith.”279 Hittinger later and more clearly accuses the NNL theory of fideism with respect to its 
account being founded upon it.280 While such an accusation need not be disqualifying; it cuts to the 
heart of a system of new natural law and reason. 
 To avoid the charge of fideism, Hittinger posits only two alternatives, i.e., two ways out. The 
first embraces a Thomistic interpretation, with all its theoretical and metaphysical supports. This 
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approach treats the praeambula fidei, and in so doing, incorporates religion, even the Christian religion, 
in a way that acknowledges the interplay of faith and reason. That is, such a system can lean upon 
Christian truths and even Christian revelation, inasmuch as this revelation coincides with the 
praeambula fidei, without accusations of fideism. The second way involves a Kantian paradigm of an 
implicational approach.281 This way respects religious principles but refuses to align them (in terms 
of foundation weight) to the principles and meanings of human subjectivity.282  
As a final critique with respect to the foundations of the Grisez-Finnis system, Hittinger 
points out the perceived illogic of the good of religion being important and incommensurable, etc. 
In so doing, he observes that such an approach is a stark departure from St. Thomas’ use of natural 
religion and supernatural faith. St. Thomas relies upon both faith and an understanding of the 
positive knowledge with respect to the praeambula fidei to point to religion as being greater than other 
goods; it orders one more closely to the final end.283 He adamantly defends the contention that 
natural law thinking has traditionally defended, if not relied upon, the summum bonum. The efforts of 
Grisez-Finnis, Hittinger concludes, aim to recover natural law, but do so by way of short-cut, rather 
than genuine recovery.284 
NNL—A CRITIQUE 
 By way of a direct response to Hittinger’s critique, Germain Grisez wrote a twenty-seven 
page defense of the NNL theory. A full exegesis would not be necessary, as Grisez brings back 
many previous arguments, however a few samples may be instructive enough. 
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 For example, by way of defending the incommensurability of goods along with the absence 
of a sense of hierarchy among the basic goods, Grisez argues not that there is no  objective hierarchy 
among the basic human goods, but rather that there are senses in which there is no hierarchy.285 The 
objectivity, in terms of hierarchy, flows from a Christian foundation. Therefore, absent that 
Christian foundation, there is no objective standard against which goods might be judged. Such is the 
case because the goods are viewed in terms of their immanence in the particular intelligible 
possibility. Any movement toward a consequentialist ethic must be avoided. 
 Grisez approaches Hittinger’s accusation of fideism and mis-use of “religion” in a systematic 
and exegetical way. He proceeds through the complaints offered by Hittinger and offers, albeit brief, 
responses. He defends himself against claims of denying the praeambula fidei,286 as well as preserving a 
distinction between the natural goodness of man and that of God. He maintains a divine priority. 
The proportion of the divine goodness relates to the potentiality of fulfillment of human goods and 
not a direct proportionality between human nature and divine goodness in itself.287 He denies the 
implication of Hittinger that his system offers merely confusion or befuddlement. In fact, He 
charges Hittinger with an incomplete and prejudiced reading. He points to a strict hermeneutic of 
theoretical underpinnings that shape and direct Hittinger’s reading and cause him to ignore the 
fullness of the NNL theory. “As a result, he systematically misunderstands what we say.”288 
***** 	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1990s 
Thomist—MINIMALISM 
 Two years after his fierce criticism of the NNL, Russell Hittinger introduces a new critique 
of the theory as a minimalist theory. By minimalist, Hittinger means that practical reason is reduced 
to a restricted sense that does not authentically represent the fulfillment of the human person.  In 
fact he declares, “Grisez adopts a kind of scorched earth policy, ruling out final ends and objective 
hierarchies in order to protect the basic goods against proportionalism.”289 He contrasts the 
minimalist approach with a rich Thomistic sense that views practical reason as ordering finite good 
to the ultimate end and perfection of the human activity (person). This richness plays itself out with 
a depth of moral activity or action which does not begin at choice and cannot separate, as Grisez 
does, a pre-moral principle from a principle of morality. The latter’s system sees the first principle as 
commanding activity to have a point, whereas the former commands one to act in accord with what 
is good.290 The NNL theory thus allows for a bare bones look at goods without their necessary 
attachments, teleologies, and ontologies. “This very much suits the modern, or at least post-Kantian, 
commitment to emancipate moral choice from the teleological matrix of nature.”291 
NNL--MINIMALISM 
 As the 1990s began, the decade brought with it a new vibrancy to the debates between the 
Thomists and the NNL theorists. As proponents of each group began to increase, new champions 
emerged. Though not new in terms of the 1990s, certain figures added prominently to the 
discussions. In supporting the NNL theory, both a new and an old supporter contributed much 
during this time. Professors Robert George and William May offered books and articles 	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supplementing their conviction to the veracity of the NNL position. Thus it is to these two that we 
now turn. 
 Professor William May had long been a proponent of the NNL theory as the 1990s arrived. 
An early editor of Germain Grisez’s work, he had been impressed with the scholarship and had 
contributed to Grisez’ summa, The Way of the Lord Jesus. Professor May published an introductory 
textbook for moral theology in 1991, “which is heavily indebted to the work of Grisez.”292 At the 
outset he appeals to the NNL understanding of practical reason as directed to basic goods. It is 
these goods that can be said to be naturally apprehended, i.e., non-discursively, by the practical 
reason.293 For even employing St. Thomas’ three-fold ordering of goods, May presents them as 
starting points for moral thought, or principles of practical reason. He subsequently, perhaps in a 
conciliatory way, proceeds to defend the NNL theory as being more in line with St. Thomas than 
some Thomists, and perhaps Grisez and Finnis, would concede. To St. Thomas’ three-fold goods, 
he points to the NNL theory’s expanding and identification of all the basic goods; goods that are 
goods “of persons, and not for persons.”294 For though they may come from non-inferential 
understanding, they, “like Aquinas,” can speak of basic and natural inclinations as illuminating these 
goods.  
 The distinction between the first principle of practical reason and the first principle of 
morality (the use of which leads to pre-moral goods) May credits directly to a correct interpretation 
of St. Thomas. He cites the use of the Golden Rule as a first principle of morality that directs the 
way one is to fulfill the first principle of practical reason. For it is integral human fulfillment and the 
heart’s “openness” to it that defines a morally upright person. In staying close to St. Thomas, 
however, May observes a key distinction between the two which he identifies as a close relation:  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  292	  William	  E.	  May,	  An	  Introduction	  to	  Moral	  Theology,	  (Huntington,	  IN:	  Our	  Sunday	  Visitor,	  Inc.,	  1991),	  16.	  293	  Ibid.,	  41.	  294	  Ibid.,	  60.	  
	   81	  
For St. Thomas the moral virtues inwardly dispose persons rightly toward the ‘ends’ of 
human existence, i.e., toward the basic human goods perfective of them as individuals as 
members of a community. For our authors [Grisez, Boyle, and Finnis], the ideal of integral 
human fulfillment proposed by the first moral principle as they have expressed it, is the 
‘object’ of unfettered human reason, of right reason.295 
 
The principle of morality, then, is compared to virtue inasmuch as it directs the way to achieve the 
goods. In fact, it is this principle of morality that helps to give actions their morality. The goods of 
persons do not, of themselves, have moral value, “insofar as one can participate in them immorally 
by compromising moral principles.”296 The shaping of one’s life, ultimately led by an overarching 
commitment to religious truth,297 directs one in openness to rich and integral fulfillment. 
 A very brief look at May in interpreting St. Thomas on moral absolutes speaks to the NNL 
idealism. He concerns himself especially with rejecting and correcting the approach of the 
consequentialists (proportionalists). He does locate the seat of morality in the intention however. At 
the same time, he holds on to the object, end, and circumstance criteria of St. Thomas, while 
recognizing that “human acts, precisely as ‘human’ or ‘moral,’ receive their ‘forms’ not from nature 
but from human intelligence.”298 In speaking to the object, he offers an appeal to the Thomist 
perspective, but he maintains an idealism in that the intention (or perhaps in St. Thomas’ language 
the end) is central. Whereas the Thomist would argue that the object itself needs to be per se ordered 
to the end and thus “directs” the moral act, May does not proceed as far down this ontological road; 
instead, the end or intention makes moral (in either a good or evil way) the object or material of the 
act. His system, like that of the Thomists, can and does therefore uphold moral absolutes—
exceptions cannot be found. 
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 The way in which May interprets St. Thomas as he relates the NNL theory to it can be 
found in a brief article he wrote for the publication Anthropotes.299  He breaks down the precepts of 
natural law into sets and subsets. The first set, to which belong two subsets, are both the basic 
practical principle (good is to be done and pursued and evil avoided) and moral principles like love 
the Lord God and love your neighbor as yourself. The first, interestingly, “do not enable us to 
distinguish between morally good and morally bad alternatives of choice.”300 Whereas the second 
subset, which, as he offers it, flows from Christian morals, gives the capacity to judge between good 
and bad alternatives. The combination of the two underlines the formulation of the fundamental 
principle that demands a heart’s openness to “all the goods of human existence and to the persons 
in whom these goods are meant to flourish.”301 The Christian Gospel and faith does not override or 
make foreign natural moral reasoning; rather, “it deepens and inwardly fulfills the natural mode of 
moral law by perfecting the basic moral requirements of the natural law and its modes of 
responsibility.”302 Note, then, how Christian faith shapes that second subset, and consequent sets of 
precepts, as corrective and perfective. The Christian is thus commanded to live out his or her 
vocation to love, and to love as Christ loves. 
 Another worthy advocate and proponent of the NNL theory is the McCormick Professor of 
Jurisprudence at Princeton University, Robert George. Like May, George is a long-time supporter of 
the work of Grisez, Finnis, et. al. Thus, we will look at two of his defenses of the NNL theory. One 
comes in the form of a review of Hittinger’s book while the other is included in a series of essays 
(which he edited) that concern natural law theory. Within a much larger review of critics of the NNL 
theory published in the University of Chicago Law Review, Robert George both elucidates some key 
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points with respect to the NNL theory and defends against misinterpretations of the system, 
particularly Russell Hittinger’s. In so doing, he first and easily dismisses the Kantian charge leveled 
against the system—George convincingly argues that, in fact, morality is grounded, and grounded in 
basic human goods—and proceeds to explain the way in which the NNL theory interprets practical 
reason as being distinct from, though not inexorably separated from, theoretical reason. He aims to 
illumine how practical reason rests upon its own underived and self-evident principles. By way of the 
rapid destruction of Veatch’s “wall of separation,” George points to the speculative reasoning as 
being most, if not wonderfully, helpful in removing doubts and bolstering practical truths, without 
certainly establishing self-evidence.303 Practical reason does not operate without data, drawn from 
nature, etc., and at the same times maintains its distinctiveness.  
 George brings out this point more clearly in his essay (published four years after the review) 
in which he makes note of the often-neglected (by neo-scholastics) distinction between an 
epistemological and ontological approach. He points to Finnis as making a strong epistemological 
argument that reflects “(1) knowledge of the intrinsic value certain ends or purposes is acquired in 
non-inferential acts of understanding wherein we grasp self-evident truths, and (2) these ends or 
purposes are intrinsically valuable (and thus can be grasped as self-evidently worth while) because 
they are intrinsically perfective of human beings.”304 George, thus, emphasizes that principles of 
practical reason are underived and self-evident. It does not follow, therefore, that moral principles 
have no grounding in human nature. In fact, it is precisely from the agent’s humanity that the 
morality flows. Thomist ontology seems to beg the question with respect to human nature. It is the 
human potentialities that point to human nature; intelligibility of the first practical principles in the 
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NNL theory do not proceed from an attractiveness, and thus a subjectivity.305 Thus it becomes 
crucial, as George defends, to distinguish between practical precepts and those norms of morality 
(or of practical reasonableness). The pre-moral character of the former points to their basic reasons 
for acting; hence their practical quality; they cannot be deduced from anything else. “The objects of 
human acts are the intelligible ends of such act, i.e., the basic human goods to which first practical 
principles refer.”306 
 One cannot overemphasize understanding with respect to the first practical principles. It is 
not some kind of conjuring or deducing that arrives at these self-evident principles. The self-
evidence does not necessarily entail their being “easy” to understand. Inasmuch as St. Thomas 
distinguished self-evident proposition that are available to all from those that are available to some, 
so too are the self-evident practical principles not to be thought of as all immediately understood. 
Herein theoretical reasoning and data of nature provide material and dialectic that support, but not 
prove, these truths.307 Additionally, George notes the importance with respect to potentialities that 
integral human fulfillment cannot be fully realized; human will can be chosen to be compatible to it. 
“The standard of practical reasonableness is not how close we come to bringing about integral 
fulfillment in our choices...;rather, it is whether our choices are compatible with a will to integral 
human fulfillment.”308 Integral human fulfillment is neither a state achieved nor a goal sought. We 
choose compatibility or incompatibility of our will to fulfillment.  
 Similarly, by way of clarification, George draws out the distinction between goods and 
actions that bring about a participation in the goods. He recalls the criticism of Hittinger by way of 
an example of an Aztec religious ritual involving human sacrifice as being a “good of religion.”  
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intelligibility or reason for action. It does not, however, make the action objectively and morally 
good. The kind of goodness at issue, whether a good with respect to reason-for-doing or with 
respect to morality, makes all the difference. Morality follows moral norms which derive from 
modes of responsibility.309 It is crucial that the distinction between kinds of goods be maintained so 
that action might then be judged against the moral norms. Otherwise “immoral” actions are in 
themselves unintelligible and beyond moral judgment. George and the NNL theorists contend that 
this way, this method of moral judgment, provides the most authentic interpretation of the human 
act. 
Thomists—MINIMALISM 
 Two very interesting and short critiques of the NNL theory emerge from two Thomists, one 
old, one new: Henry Veatch and Steven Long. Less defenses of Thomism—they lean on St. Thomas 
as one might lean on a steady and entrenched pillar—and more directed views on the NNL, they 
help to clarify the NNL position, as well as to solidify its distinction from the Thomist one. 
 Henry Veatch, along with Joseph Rautenberg, authored a brief article highlighting the 
philosophy of the NNL theory as resting on a mistake.310 That is, they point out a flawed view of 
morality (re: non Aristotelian-Thomist) that ironically yokes the NNL theory (which they term 
Grifennboyle) into the same camp as its explicit opposite, e.g., utilitarians and proportionalists. The 
mistake stems from a philosophy that can most accurately be described as altruistic or impartial. It 
would seem that the NNL position follows, basically, the same system of moral reasoning as most 
modern ethical “theories.” They outline five common features of the “theory” that nearly all modern 
ethical “theories” share. These include: (1) ethical knowledge is divorced from scientific knowledge; 
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and desire reflecting a subjective appropriation; (3) morality entails a universalizability criterion; (4) 
subjectively weighting words like good and value thus have no real place in ethical theories; and (5) 
once goods have been de-natured, no partiality may be shown for the good(s) of one person over 
another’s.311  In outlining the common features of modern ethical “theories,” the authors quickly 
point out how sympathetic the NNL theory is in relation to these modern, i.e., utilitarian and 
deontological, positions. These features, by their de-naturing of goods, move ethics from a person-
centered approach to a person-neutral one.  In so doing, they divorce the good from the perfection 
of the human person. Choice becomes the fulcrum of morality. 
 The mistake, therefore, rests on the fear that maintaining the nature of goods with respect to 
Aristotelian eudaimonia leads to a proportionist subjectivity.312 This fear, however, wrongly equates a 
happiness (virtue) and person-centered approach with a kind of hedonistic and subjective 
proportionalism. The only response left to NNL theorists is to list pre-moral goods, that is, goods 
divorced from their inherent relation to an agent. Thus, the first principle of practical reason, which 
identifies these goods, remains distinct from the first principle of morality, which directs choice. The 
universalizability of the actions that any modern “theory” supposes cannot grasp a condition in 
which, subjectively, an individual judges a good to be a good for him or herself, and, at the same 
time, see such a good to be a benefit, in similar circumstances, for everyone.313 An ontological view 
to nature, rather than just an epistemological exercise, sees and embraces a good that perfects. 
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   Steven Long, as part of his doctoral dissertation, critiques minimalist systems of natural law 
and situates the NNL theory as belonging also to a minimalist worldview, though he identifies its 
minimalism with respect to formal and not material qualities.314 In outlining again the basic structure 
and system of the NNL theory, Long sees a transcendence of the strict minimalism of H.L.A. Hart, 
but focuses upon the insistence of an account of human good not dependent on prior theoretical 
reasoning. Thus, Long investigates more fully the epistemic foundations and implications of the 
NNL (as represented by Finnis) position of formal minimalism; he does so particularly with respect 
to goods and law. 
 Long takes aim at an end’s relation as being basic to human nature. Regardless of its 
epistemic complexity, “its logical or epistemic derivability or nonderivability flows from its relation 
to other objects of knowledge.”315 Finnis, Long argues, does not sufficiently explain the relation 
between the value of the good itself and its relation to other objects. St. Thomas, in contrast, 
understands that, for self-evident propositions, the predicate inheres in the essence of the subject.316 
Such relation to essence has no room in Finnis’ system. Any derivation of good, which St. Thomas 
and the Thomist position supply in spades, undermines the underivability of the basic goods. 
Speculative knowledge, in following St. Thomas’ argument, necessarily comes before practical, since 
“both the speculative and practical employment of the intelligence require the prior apprehension of 
the object.”317 The truth of the good of the object must be known beforehand. 
 Long, too, finds a Kantian deontological underpinning in the insistence that basic goods are 
natural apart from nature. The Finnis system proposes a human nature as discovered or “invented” 
in action. This contrasts with the Thomist contention that “actions are not good merely because 
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they are performed, but because of their ordinacy to their ends.”318 The NNL position is not moored 
in the order of nature. Absent such a normativity, then, the NNL position inevitably finds itself 
compelled to seek a self-imposed law, “a deontological tour de force.”319 There fails to be any positive 
support for the NNL position to call itself natural law. 
 A deeply teleological natural law cannot label all goods as incommensurate. Unlike the NNL, 
Long argues, St. Thomas never claims that all goods are incommensurate; in fact, he proposes just 
the opposite.320 Every ethical and moral act must be viewed in light of the final end or perfection of 
the person, and society. Such goods and actions are, per se, more noble inasmuch as they are closer to 
the “consummate actuation” of a person’s ultimate end. An egalitarianism such as that proposed by 
the NNL does not accurately reflect the powers of the soul; “what is impossible is that the human 
will, as such, be simultaneously and formally ordered toward diverse final ends.”321 Finnis contention 
that any commensurability among goods would be arbitrary fails to convince on even a common 
sense level, e.g., the saving of a life is valued more than the good of play. Perhaps it is important to 
recognize that a hierarchy does not make certain goods “less good” (with a negative connotation); 
rather, it manifests the natural order of creation and wisdom by which certain goods more 
proximately move the actor to the ultimate end. Every good, however, moves one toward that goal. 
The role of the principle of morality by which a practiced preference might be actualized does not 
satisfy the ontological grounding of morality.322 
 Lastly, the insistence upon the formal distinction and separation of practical reason from the 
theoretical divorces the grounding of natural law from an understanding of God as creator. The 
God of Christian revelation, real though He is, is not the specified God at question. Rather, the God 
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Who can be known by natural reasoning, this God grounds and makes normative moral precepts. 
For it is in God that nature finds its true finality. “That is to say, that in creatures, the being that 
perfects them and their being as standing-in-of-moral-perfection are distinct: only in God are being 
and good absolutely one.”323 Without an understanding of God—Who can be known by natural 
reason—in what way would the intelligibility of nature, as a sign that points to perfection, be at play? 
An absence of God would strip nature of an intelligibility to perfection. Natural law would seem a 
weak law, or even no law at all. 
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Chapter 5 
ROMA LOCUTA EST. CAUSA FINITA EST. 
 
Veritatis Splendor 
 In the second half of 1993, Pope John Paul II promulgated a long anticipated encyclical 
concerning moral theology, Veritatis Splendor. Following on the heels of the earlier publication of a 
new and revised edition of the Catechism of the Catholic Church, the Church, it would seem, was wading 
in deeply with regard to moral questions and reasoning. The former document relates specifically to 
moral theology and the proper approach to be taken with respect to moral theology, while the latter 
situated the moral order within a larger and complete context of the Christian life. The pope’s stated 
impetus for offering his letter was the “lack of harmony between the traditional response of the Church and 
certain theological positions, encountered even in seminaries and in faculties of theology, with regard to 
questions of the greatest importance for the Church and for the life of faith of Christians, as well as for the 
life of society itself.”324 Though polemical in tone, the pope emphasizes the connection among the 
Christian truth, the moral life, and society at large. Thus the questions at play, i.e., natural law, affect 
all people and not simply Christians. The Church, as the guardian of sacra doctrina, has great wisdom 
and truth to offer the world. The encyclical’s second purpose, as explained by Servais Pinckaers, 
O.P., namely, to link the Church’s moral teaching to the Gospel,325 illustrates this role of “universal” 
teacher. 
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 As a kind of reproach to proportionalism and other teleologisms,326 the encyclical 
emphasizes a “response of love from us rather than strict legal obedience. This reintroduces into moral 
theology, right from the start of Christian life, that dynamism of love which carries us toward 
perfection.”327 The emphasis on a response of love, coupled with a movement toward perfection, 
situates the human agent within a dynamic arena of action and responsibility. The transcendental-
fundamental-option-type approach, wherein an action need not immediately and fully shape or 
transform the agent, does not fit within a Catholic understanding of morality and grace. In speaking 
of sin and of failing in the particular to love God, the pope remarks: “with every freely committed 
mortal sin, he offends God as the giver of the law; even if he perseveres in faith, he loses ‘sanctifying 
grace,’ ‘charity’ and ‘eternal happiness.’”328 Thus, in this intervention on the part of the pope, several 
models of moral theology are culled from authentic expositions of the faith. 
 In speaking to the moral order to which persons belong and within which they act, the pope 
teaches: “others speak, and rightly so, of theonomy, or participated theonomy, since man’s free obedience 
to God’s law effectively implies that human reason and human will participate in God’s wisdom and 
providence.”329 This illustrates that no false autonomy can enter within the discussion of morality 
and natural law. Even moral theology and natural law, he goes on to stress, do not escape the 
providence of Divine Law. Russell Hittinger, in commenting on the encyclical, remarks that all laws, 
both natural and positive, direct movement. They cannot be viewed as if in a vacuum, without any 
effect on the person as a whole. Not even conscience acts outside God’s wisdom. The temptation, 
offered to our first parents, to be as gods cannot be embraced. Such a temptation, which “means 	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that the human mind is a measuring measure, having plenary authority to impart measures of moral 
good and evil,”330cannot determine action. Objectivity in terms of morals must be maintained. 
 In analyzing Veritatis Splendor, Hittinger and other Thomists find solace and justification for 
their efforts in the writing of the pope.331 Several sections of the encyclical point to a support of a 
Thomistic approach to moral theology. Alasdair MacIntyre, for example, points out the way in 
which authentic morality excludes a fully Kantian deontology, in that “we are also to obey that law 
for the sake of the further good of ourselves and of others.”332 The emphasis on good, and the good 
of and for the person, drives moral action and theology. The connection between the good and the 
person cannot be severed, as it might in a proportionist or utilitarian approach. Servais Pinckaers, 
O.P., draws a connection to the virtues in moral judgments that precludes thinking too much in the 
form of an algorithm. A reduction to technique threatens to separate, again, the person from the 
action. The Christian, or eschatological connection to actions, cannot be excluded either (it fits 
within viewing action in relation to the whole person). This emphasizes the finality of God as 
Good—“the encyclical shows how the desire for the good, which is natural to man, is directed to 
God and finds a complete fulfillment only in the teaching and person of Christ.”333 He fearlessly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  330	  Russell	  Hittinger,	  “Natural	  Law	  and	  Catholic	  Moral	  Theology,”	  in	  A	  Preserving	  Grace:	  Protestants,	  Catholics,	  
and	  Natural	  Law,	  ed.	  Michael	  Cromartie,	  (Grand	  Rapids,	  MI:	  William	  B.	  Eerdmans	  Publishing	  Company,	  1997),	  24.	  331	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  both	  the	  Thomists	  and	  the	  NNL	  theorists	  view	  this	  encyclical	  in	  highest	  esteem.	  That	  is,	  it	  is	  not	  another	  mere	  voice	  among	  the	  arguing	  moral	  theologians.	  Rather,	  they	  see	  the	  authoritatively	  declared	  teachings	  of	  the	  Church	  as	  coming	  from	  the	  Magisterium	  and	  the	  service	  of	  the	  moral	  theologian	  as	  one	  to	  deepen	  knowledge	  and	  understanding	  of	  the	  revealed	  truth.	  Professor	  William	  May	  remarks:	  “The	  pope	  regards	  this	  service	  of	  ‘utmost	  importance,	  not	  only	  for	  the	  Church’s	  life	  and	  mission,	  but	  also	  for	  human	  society	  and	  culture’	  (no.	  111).	  But	  he	  emphasized	  that	  ‘dissent,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  carefully	  orchestrated	  protests	  and	  polemics	  carried	  on	  in	  the	  media,	  is	  opposed	  to	  ecclesial	  communion	  and	  to	  a	  correct	  understanding	  of	  the	  
hierarchical	  constitution	  of	  the	  People	  of	  God’	  (no.	  113).	  If	  theologians	  do	  dissent	  in	  this	  way,	  he	  continues,	  ‘the	  Church’s	  Pastors	  have	  the	  duty	  to	  act	  in	  conformity	  with	  their	  apostolic	  mission,	  insisting	  that	  the	  right	  of	  the	  
faithful	  to	  receive	  Catholic	  doctrine	  in	  it	  purity	  and	  integrity	  mist	  be	  respected’	  (no.	  113)”[William	  May,	  An	  
introduction	  to	  Moral	  Theology,	  revised	  edition,	  (Harrington,	  IN:	  Our	  Sunday	  Visitor	  Publishing	  Division,	  1994),	  278].	  	  	  332	  Alasdair	  MacIntyre,	  “How	  Can	  We	  Learn	  What	  Veritatis	  Splendor	  Has	  to	  Teach?”	  in	  The	  Splendor	  of	  the	  
Truth:	  Veritatis	  Splendor	  and	  the	  Renewal	  of	  Moral	  Theology,	  Studies	  by	  Ten	  Outstanding	  Scholars,	  ed.	  J.A.	  DiNoia,	  O.P.	  and	  Romanus	  Cessario,	  O.P.,	  (Princeton,	  NJ:	  Scepter	  Publishers,	  1999),	  79.	  333	  Pinckaers,	  “An	  Encyclical	  for	  the	  Future,”	  55.	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proclaims happiness as the goal and motivation. In so doing, Pinckaers finds in this encyclical a call 
to the restoration of the good and to the happy life. Not merely negative, the moral life leads and 
directs to joy. 
 Much like the Thomists, the NNL theorists find in the encyclical a sympathetic and verifying 
voice. In a critique of proportionalist complaints against the encyclical, William May writes in 
defense of the right understanding of basic goods. Though he does not explicitly connect their 
influence on the thinking of John Paul II, he notes how they would not be incompatible with the 
explanation of choice, and of the role of the will in such choices.334 Furthermore, there is little, if 
any, within the encyclical that would exclude elements of NNL theory as expounded upon by its 
proponents. May points out that the pope views conscience to be a “practical judgment” and not the 
decision itself on how to act. It is the proximate norm of morality that reveals to the person the 
truth with respect to moral good and evil. Thus the NNL theorists, too, see the object as being key 
to understanding morality. Germain Grisez is quick to point to the pope who states such a reality: 
“the doctrine of the object as a source of morality represents an authentic explication of the Biblical 
morality of the Covenant and of the commandments, of charity and of the virtues.”335 
 Veritatis Splendor determines neither a particular philosophical approach nor a theological way 
of reasoning; in fact, John Paul II, early on, states the role and even competence of the Magisterium 
in matters of philosophical and theological inquiry:  
“Certainly the Church's Magisterium does not intend to impose upon the faithful any 
particular theological system, still less a philosophical one. Nevertheless, in order to 
‘reverently preserve and faithfully expound’ the word of God. The Magisterium has the duty 
to state that some trends of theological thinking and certain philosophical affirmations are 
incompatible with revealed truth.”336 
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  William	  E.	  May,	  “John	  Paul	  II,	  Moral	  Theology,	  and	  Moral	  Theologians,”	  in	  The	  Splendor	  of	  the	  Truth:	  Veritatis	  Splendor	  and	  the	  Renewal	  of	  Moral	  Theology,	  Studies	  by	  Ten	  Outstanding	  Scholars,	  ed.	  J.A.	  DiNoia,	  O.P.	  and	  Romanus	  Cessario,	  O.P.,	  (Princeton,	  NJ:	  Scepter	  Publishers,	  1999),	  232-­‐3.	  335	  John	  Paul	  II,	  Veritatis,	  no.	  82.	  336	  Ibid.,	  no.	  29.	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In the first article in a six part series on the reception of the encyclical published by The Tablet, 
Germain Grisez very succinctly draws upon a reality embraced by both the Thomists and the NNL 
theorists; namely, God reveals Himself to His creation and He does so effectively and perfectly 
through His Son, and thereby entrusts its proper interpretation and transmission to His Son’s Bride 
the Church.337 Thus, each group recognizes the order and role of the theologian and moral 
theologian both within the life of the Church and with respect to the service of the truth for the 
people of God. Not an independent and alternative voice, collaboration rather than dissent marks a 
servant of the Truth.   
  
CONCLUSION 
I make note of such a role because it brings to a focus the efforts we have undertaken in this 
project. The Thomists and the NNL theorists disagree on many foundational and important 
philosophical principles. Each, however, seeks to be a faithful servant in the Church—they strive to 
be a servant as their Savior is a servant. Therefore, upon the publication of Veritatis Splendor, they 
came to see again their work with the context of the Church, seeking always sentire cum ecclesia.  
 By way of conclusion it might be helpful to recall some of the key questions or concerns 
raised at the beginning by Michael Crowe. He highlighted the need to understand nature, law, and 
moral absolutes. With regards to a Catholic understanding of natural law, there remains, always in 
the background, the way in which this study reveals God’s wisdom and our participation in the plan 
of God. As such the Catholic theologian and philosopher must answer to a “higher” judge. It is not 
to this lofty perch that I aim right now; instead, I offer some brief remarks with respect to each area 
of concern. 
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  Germain	  Grisez,	  “Revelation	  versus	  dissent,”	  The	  Tablet	  (16	  October	  1993):	  1331.	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In regards to nature, the Thomist position seems to penetrate more deeply into the fullness 
and dynamism of nature. For example, the dynamism inherent in McInerny’s presentation of nature 
can easily be noted. Were there a static element to nature, then the compulsion to embrace the good 
would not oblige. The good is not merely a goal to be achieved in a manner akin to a gold star or a 
blue ribbon, i.e. something added on. It is not starkly distinct from the composition of human 
nature, and thus of each person. More than fulfilling nature, the good informs the nature, to use an 
Aristotelian expression, as a final cause.  To act virtuously, that is to act in a manner by which the 
person exercises his or her powers338 well, thus guides all human acts, inasmuch as they are human 
acts. It can sound harsh, but there is something to the saying that to act against one’s nature, to act 
unvirtuously, to sin, is to act inhumanly. 
As the discussion moves toward law, the contrast between the two groups becomes very 
apparent. The Thomists ground their theory in the teleology and in-built nature of things 
themselves. In so doing moral reasoning can be somewhat “easier” or more “intuitive.” There would 
seem to be less room for a kind of complexity; human appropriation can only stretch reasonableness 
so far with respect to the nature of a thing. The NNL position, on the other hand, aims to a quite 
lofty goal—integral human fulfillment. This ideal, and perhaps unattainable ideal, compels action 
and creates oughts. Such a theory involves significantly more complexity and argumentation. While 
many conclusions are sound, the wonder becomes, what of a better argument or more intelligent 
interlocutor? Perhaps what seemed wrong once might, now, be “turned” to be right. 
Lastly, in terms or moral absolutes, this concern follows very closely from the previous view 
toward law. There is a kind of concreteness in the Thomistic system of moral absolutes. The nature, 
even in its dynamism, does not substantially change—it only gets more or less perfect. The NNL 
theory can seem to declare more encompassing absolutes inasmuch as integral fulfillment, or at least 	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  E.g.	  the	  faculties	  and	  powers	  of	  the	  soul—to	  reason	  and	  to	  love	  well.	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compatibility, must be maintained. The lack of a natural and objective hierarchy, however, risks 
losing the force of more important absolutes in exchange for lesser protections. For example, one 
can build upon the earlier criticism regarding the conflict of golf (leisure) and Church (religion). 
Noting that neither can be dismissed or harmed, the equivocation of the two becomes difficult to 
defend from a commonsense perspective (though scores of atheists would, I imagine, have no 
trouble relegating religion to a lesser pedestal); but even more so, in light of the witness of saints and 
martyrs, the equality begins to wane. 
It is following these brief remarks, then, that we conclude this expository study. Something 
new must happen as each theory proceeds. We have witnessed the struggle with which each sought 
to understand and to explain the truth—fides quaerens intellectum. In their pursuit and debate, we saw a 
specification of their belief and yet we saw it within the context and confines of the Church and the 
Truth. We saw two theories proposed; we saw no theory declared conclusively the victor; we saw 
theology alive. 
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